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ABSTRACT 
THE IDEOLOGY AND TEXTBOOKS: "TURKISH REPUBLIC HISTORY OF 
RENOVATION M'D ATATURKISM" TEXTBOOKS (1980-1990) 
I~1k GURLEYEN 
Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Ass. Prof Banu HEL V ACIOGLU 
August, 1998 
This study aims to analyze the specific understanding of history in the 1980s 
in Turkey. It is argued that this particular historical understanding is ideologically 
shaped by Kemalism and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse. These two 
contradictory and complementary views exist together in the "Turkish Republic 
History of Renovation and Ataturkism" textbooks, which are used as a tool to 
convey the regime's ideological stance to the high-school students. In this context, 
these textbooks are examined in terms of their contents with regard to an identity 
formation characterized by nationalist, statist, religious but secular values. 
Keywords: Kemalism, Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, history, textbooks, citizenship, 
ideology. 
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OZET 
iDEOLOJi VE DERS KiT APLARI: "TDR.KiYE CUMHURiYETi iNKILAP 
TARiHi VE ATATORK<;OLOK" DERS KiTAPLARI (1980-1990) 
l§Ik GURLEYEN 
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yonetimi Boliimii 
Dant§man: Yrd. Doy. Banu HELVACIOGLU 
Agustos 1998 
Bu yalt§ma. Tiirkiye'de 1980'lerde goriilen belirli bir tarih anlayt§tru 
incelemektedir. <;ah§mada, bu tarih anlayt§1mn ideolojik ay1dan Kemalizm ve Tiirk-
islam Sentezi soylemi tarafindan §ekillendirildigi iddia edilmektedir. Bu iki gorii§, 
rejimin ideolojik tercihini lise ogrencilerine iletmek iizere kullarulan "Tiirkiye 
Cumhuriyeti inktlap Tarihi ve Atatiirkyiiliik" ders kitaplarmda birarada ortaya 
ytkmaktadrr. Bu baglamda sozkonusu kitaplann iyerigi, milliyetyi, devletyi, islami 
fakat laik degerler aytsmdan incelenmektedir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kemalizm, Turk islam Sentezi, tarih, ders kitaplan, yurtta§hk, 
ideoloji. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Jn the papers, at schools, always the same official history is seen. 
Since the young people read the same story continuously, this 
bore them. 
They hate the most interesting, the most important period of 
Turkey. 
Also at the universities this same stereotyped, old ideological 
history is taught.1 
Erich Jan Ziircher 
In Turkey there is a particular understanding of Turkish history. The 
main determinant in this particular understanding is Kemalism which is the 
dominant ideology since the establishment of the Republic. Although there have 
always been rival ideologies, Kemalism since 1930s succeeded in surviving in a 
way that almost all of the political arguments need to reconcile its views with 
Kemalism some how. 
Following the 1980 Military Coup D'etat social, political and economic 
transformations in the 1980s re-strengthened Kemalist ideology. Also in this 
period another significant development was the rise of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis 
discourse. The relation between Kemalism and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is both 
1Quotcd in Mithat Baydur, in "inlalap Tarihi "Dersleri Nasif Okutulma!t, Zafer Toprak, Halil 
Berktay, Biilent Tanor (istanbul: Sarmal Yaymevi, 1997), 98. 
contradictory and complementary. It is complementary because the 1980 
Military Regime emphasized both Kemalist and Islamic values as its ideological 
bases. Besides because of the dominance of Kemalism as the official ideology 
supporters of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis decided to reconcile their views with 
the former. On the other hand they are contradictory because of Kemalism' s 
militant secularism. As a result in the 1980s these two views exist in school 
textbooks together. 
Just as many other regimes the Republican Regime has used education as 
a tool for ideological justification among other tools. In this context "Turkish 
Republic History of Renovation and Atatiirkism" courses appear to be a special 
case. Having changed many names these courses have been used since the early 
years of 1930s to justify the policies of Republican Regime. The particular 
understanding of citizenship and history of the regime appears clearly in the 
textbooks of this course. In the 1980s in these textbooks Kemalism and Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis discourse shape the specific citizenship and history 
understanding in accordance with the 1980 Military Regime's political 
perception. 
The 1980 Military Regime came to power determined to find a lasting 
solution to the economic, social and political crisis that Turkey was facing at the 
time. In the officers' opinion the worst thing that could happen to a society was 
the fragmentation of society and weakening of the state authority. So they 
interpreted the crisis of the time in these terms and they suggested special 
2 
projects in order to prevent the recurrence of such a crisis in Turkey. In these 
specific projects, education had an important role. The Military Regime made 
good use of education system to establish the natural guardians of Turkish state 
and society. The regime tried to reshape the minds of a new generation so that 
the society's unity would not be threatened again. The question of whether they 
have been successful or not in achieving this specific purpose is subject of 
another debate. It suffices to say that they not only targeted potential regime 
opponents among professors, but also made certain curriculum changes and 
modified the content of the textbooks. Although in 1983 they transferred power 
to the civilian regime the policies of Generals continued to effect the education 
system. 
While implementing the above mentioned policies officers, consciously 
or unconsciously, introduced the ideas of a certain group, that is the 
Intellectuals' Hearth, into the textbooks. This group supported the 1980 military 
intervention wholeheartedly. Although they did not share power with the 
officers, their views were widely welcomed by the Military Regime. To put it in 
another way the ideology of the officers corresponded the ideas defended by this 
group. Their version of longly discussed Turkish-Islamic(-Westem) Synthesis 
was espe<;i&}ly effective in rewriting the textbooks for Turkish History of 
Renovation courses at high schools in a new mentality. The key concepts of this 
discourse were the exaltation of state authority and the superiority of Turkish 
3 
nation. These concepts were echoed in the education policy of the 1980 Military 
Regime. It can be argued that these are helpful in understanding this policy. 
Since the main objective of this study is to understand the specific 
citizenship position given in "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and 
Atatiirkism" courses, first it is necessary to examine Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, 
Kemalism and the relation between them. In doing this the Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis discourse is analyzed to highlight the process of introducing a 
particular understanding of state and the role of individual vis-a-vis the state. 
Second, the relation between history education and ideology both in general and 
in the Turkish case have to be analyzed. In this context the 1980 Military 
Regime's education policy and its effects on the process of shaping the mind of 
the new generations by the help of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis of the time will 
be anayzed. Then, after giving brief information about the laws, rules and 
regulations of the 1980 Military Regime with regard to education, the policy 
implications of these in the compulsory courses of "Turkish Republic History of 
Renovation and Atatiirkism" textbooks are going to be analyzed. In these 
textbooks it is going to be looked whether there is a specific emphasis on the 
main themes of Turkish Islamic Synthesis. To put it other way whether there is a 
clear attempt to bring Turkish nationalism, Islam and Kemalism together in the 
content of these textbooks is going to be analyzed. 
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CHAPTER II 
IDEOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT OF 1980-1990 
2.1. The 1980 Military Regime 
The year 1980 marks in many ways a crucial turning point in Turkey's 
political, social and economic life. The first important factor to highlight 
concerns the role of the military in the post-1980 context. The achievements of 
1980 Military Regime can be regarded as a reaction2 to the economic and 
political instability in late 1970s' Turkey. During 1970s Turkey faced what was 
perhaps the worst political and socio-economic crises of its republican history; 
social unrest, political violence, paralysis of the state bureaucracy and other 
institutions, On the economic front, there was a stagnation and deeply rooted 
instability. On the political front, a succession of weak coalition governments 
further contributed to economic instability by postponing the adjustment process 
and were unable to check the proliferation of terrorism and urban violence, 
2 General Evren, the leader of the Military Regime, stated in his various speeches that "12 
September was an obligation·· for instance see Kenan Evren 'in Am/an, vol:3, (Milliyet 
Yaymlan, 1991 ), 251. 
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threatening the security and everyday existence of the average citizen. In such an 
environment, it was not surprising that the military intervened for the third time, 
leading to the termination of civilian regime, albeit on a temporary basis. 3 
Military rule lasted from September 1980 up to the elections of 
November 1983 that marked the return to parliamentary democracy, albeit in a 
restricted form. Yet the comparatively short period of military rule embodied 
some far-reaching consequences for the future course of the democratic regime. 
Unlike the previous ones, the 1980 military takeover ambitiously aimed at 
inducing societal transformations which also can also be viewed as an attempt to 
establish a new hegemony.4 In making these transformations the reference point 
of the Military Regime was Kemalism. Copeaux call this re-surgence of 
Kemalism as neo-Kemalism.5 The objective of the military was to inject a 
substantial measure of stability into the political system which was thought to be 
a necessary requirement for the re-establishment of democracy. The measures 
taken were designed to introduce considerable elements of stability into the 
system and to help de-politicize the market and society. 
The key element in the strategy of the military was to weaken the 
political power of the left, which they regarded as the major source of potential 
3 Atilla Eralp and et al. The Political and Socio-economic transfom1ation of Turkey (Westport: 
Praeger, 1993), 1, 5. 
4 Muharrem Tiinay, "New Right's Attempt at Hegemony" in The Political and Socio-
economic transformation of Turkey, Atilla Eralp and et al (Westport: Praeger, 1993), 19. 
5 Etienne Copeaux. Tarih Ders Kitaplannda (1931-1993), Tiirk Tarih Tezinden Turk is/am 
Sentezine (istanbul: Tiirkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakft Yaymlan, 1998), 56. 
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conflict and disorder in the post-1980 context. They regard any rival ideology to 
Kemalism, especially the leftist ones as the reasons of Turkey's crisis in those 
. 
years. On the first anniversary of the 1980 coup d'etat General Kenan Evren 
stated that: 
Principal characteristics of our Republic such as devotion to Atatiirk and 
his principals and basic characteristics of our national unity were 
degenerated especially among youth, there was an attempt to destroy our 
State and divide our country ... the vacuum, which was created mistakenly 
by distancing from Atatiirk 's principles, was tried to be filled by astray 
•,J 1 • 6 iueo1ogres ... 
Hence, rather surprisingly, Islam was employed by the military as an 
instrument for consolidating and institutionalizing the post-1980 regime. In 
concrete terms, the steps taken in this direction in Turkey involved the 
introduction of religious education in primary schools as well as an increase in 
the powers of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the key state institution 
responsible for the administration of religious affairs in an otherwise secular 
state. This was done by increasing the financial resources available to it. The 
introduction of compulsory religious education clearly represented a retreat from 
the basic principles of militant secularism. 7 
As a result of these and other similar policies, the relationship between 
the Military Regime and Islam became subject of many discussions. In this 
context Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and Intellectuals' Hearth were frequently 
6 E\Ten, Kenan Evren 'in, Vol:2, 383-384. 
7 Ziya Oni~, "The political economy oflslamic resurgence in Turkey: the rise of the Welfare 
Party in perspective" Third World Quarterly. 18 (1997), 749-751. 
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expressed phrases in such political debates. There have been many different 
viewpoints with regard to the role and influence of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as 
put forward by the Intellectuals' Hearth, on the 1980 Military Regime. There is 
of course the division between pro-synthesis people and its opponents. 8 
Especially the opponents of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis perceived the 
synthesis and the Hearth as the bases of the social, cultural policies of the 1980 
Military Regime and the civilian regime following it. In other words many people 
argued that the changes in Turkish political, social and cultural life made by the 
1980 Military Regime were at least in accordance with the Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis discourse of Intellectuals' Hearth. According to many authors the 
ideology of Intellectuals' Hearth is officialized after 1983. 9 In this respect it is 
also argued that the changes in the contents of the high school history textbooks 
after 1980 can be explained by the effectiveness of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis 
in the education policies of the regimes in 1980s. On the other hand there is the 
view rejecting the role of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as against to the argument 
that it was used as a basis for ideological legitimization by the military regime in 
8 Although the opponents may have some different reasons they seem to have consensus on the 
\iew that "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis damages the secularist character of the Republic" The 
Cumhuriyet daily has been the center of this kind of ex-pressions. But there are also many 
academics such as Bozkurt Giivenc;, Vecihi Tirnuroglu, state that Islam tendency of Turkish-
Islamic S)nthesis is a threat to secularism principle. For instance, Taha Parla argues that 
"Turkey, after 1980. lagged behind 1920s in terms of secularism. Religion was risen again by 
the state in the 1980 Constitution. After 1980 coup d'etat there have been a conscious 
political-ideological intervention in order to strengthen the position of religion in the state and 
society. There is a social project and political plan." Taha Parla, Tur/dye 'nin Siyasa/ Rejimi, 
(istanbul: ileti~irn Yay., 1995), 217. 
9 Copeaux., Tarih, 59. 
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the 1980s. The Intellectuals' Hearth tried to insert the Islam factor into the 
official ideology, which is Kemalism. 
In the 1980s Turkey was not a monolithique country in ideological and 
cultural terms. 10 However this does not mean that the political power did not 
have a particular understanding of history. In this respect official ideology and 
history understanding of Kemalists have been dominant in Turkish history 
writing. 11 An evolution which advances gradually from the death of Atatiirk till 
today has lead to the formation of a history writing which covers Islamic values 
and past more. Whereas the official ideology, which is established on Kemalist 
values, was not examined overtly as the semi-official ideologies. This 
culmination produces an odd discourse mess which can also be seen in the 
school textbooks. 12 In order to understand the mess hidden under the apparently 
monotonous Kemalism, Turkish-Islamic Synthesis has to be analyzed. Thus this 
chapter aims to clarify the blurred meaning, characteristics, role and functions of 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse put forward by Intellectuals' Hearth in the 
early 1970s, in relation to the ties established with the 1980 military regime. 
10 Halil Berktay. "Dtinyada ve Tiirkiye'de Tarih~iligin Durumu ve 'Dilinin E\Tenselle~mesi' 
Uzerine Dti~iinceler·· in Tarih Ogretimi ve Ders Kitaplan, ed. Salih Ozbaran, (istanbul: Dokuz 
Eyliil Yay. 1998), 80. 
11 Here and after the tenn "official ideology" is used in a limited sense, meaning Kemalist 
undertanding which is ex-pressed systematically in the "Great Speech" of Mustafa Kemal. See 
ibid, 79-80. 
12 Copeau.x, Tarih, 54. 
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2.2. Intellectuals' Hearth 
The Intellectuals' Hearth is a right-wing elitist political association 
established in 1970. Most of the constituent members are academics and 
scientists. Here are some remarkable names: ibrahim Kafesoglu, the founder of 
the Hearth and one of the most famous theoretician of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis 
put forward by the Hearth, is a historian. Among other important figures there is 
Muharrem Ergin, who is an expert on the Orhun inscriptions, a philologist and a 
historian; Nevzat Yal~mta§, the economist, who was brought to the directorate 
of the Hearth and was one of the responsible figures of nationalist daily Tiirkiye 
for a few years; Ahmet Kabaklz, a columnist for the same daily. The hearth 
members define the Intellectuals' ~earth as "an association defending Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis, and taking sides with the state under any condition". 13 They 
do not give much importance to increasing the number of the Hearth members. 
For the founders it is more valuable to bring together politically important 
persons, technocrats, bureaucrats and academics and to emphasize the 
intellectual development of Turkish-nationalist views in right wing politics. 14 
When the general profile of the members of the hearth is examined, it is 
seen that they are pro-status quo. They are unconditionally on the side of state. 
13 Vecihl Timuroglu, Turk is/am Sentezi, (Ankara: Ba~ Yay., 1991), 138. 
14 Tami Bora/ Kemal Can. Dev/et, Ocak, Dergah: 12 Eyliil 'den 1990 'Iara ClkiiciJ Hareket 
(istanbul: ileti~im Y., 1994), 147. 
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They are addicted to "strong state" notion to which they give a great importance 
in correlating with Turkish history and mythology. Thus they are Turkish 
nationalists. Anti-Communism and the blessing of the state authority are two of 
the important factors in identifying them. They also reduced Islam's role to an 
instrumental one, at least during the initial years. In their perspective religion is 
only one of the elements that form a nation. So it can be argued that the 
Intellectuals' Hearth has maintained a secular, conservative understanding in its 
general characteristics. 15 
The Hearth targets to see the events and problems calmly and to find 
long term solutions despite the very tensioned political atmosphere. Article 2 of 
the Charter of Intellectuals' Hearth states that the purpose of the association is 
"to spread Turkish nationalist ideas by developing national culture and 
consciousness, to survive and strengthen the elements that form national 
existence by struggling against the ideological crisis and the anarchy concept 
which upset our national structure."16 
In order to explain the motives behind the establishment of Intellectuals' 
Hearth, the xenophobia and fear psychology of the founders should also be 
mentioned. This psychology was strengthened by the Cold War envirorunent. 
The source of the fears was the anxiety of rightist intellectuals with regard to the 
15 ibid, 156. 
16 Charter oflntellectuals' Hearth (Aydmlar Ocagi Tiizilgu). 
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break up of the power block of right wing politics and the masses. 17 In the late 
1960s the Justice Party (JP) was losing its character as the "great right wing 
federation". Newly established parties such as the Nationalist Action Party 
(NAP) and the Nationalist Salvation Party (NSP), were the manifestation of this 
social division in the political arena. With these new political actors coming onto 
the scene, JP's anti-Communist, conservative Islamic and nationalist discourse 
started to fragment. So the danger of permanent division of the rightists came to 
the surface. Of course, the rightist intellectuals were among the ones who saw 
this process as a danger. Looking at a picture, in which the Republican People's 
Party (RRP) was more moving towards a Social Democratic line, the leftist 
revolutionary movement was gaining more power, and they believed, at a time 
when the right was weak there is a real Communist danger. 18 The members of 
the hearth were arguing for a powerful state. In relation to their fears, they 
believed a weak state would bring the destruction of Turkish society, so they 
wanted unity. 
In order to overcome this danger and strengthen the rightist power 
block, the intellectuals, academics and writers who founded the Hearth believed 
in the necessity of a common rightist rhetoric. In order to form this they were in 
contact not only with the NAP but with other right wing political parties. 19 They 
i; Bozkurt Giiven~ and et al. Turk-Islam Sentezi.(istanbul:Sarmal Yaymevi. Eyliil 1994), 155. 
18 Bora Tami/ Kemal Can. Dev/et, 147. 
19 However, as Tami Bora argues, "the Turkist-nationalist pasts of first president ibrahim 
Kafesoglu and Muharrem Ergin, the political representative of the hearth made it, a bridge 
between JP and NAP at least in the initial years of foundation" ibid, l·H. 
12 
wanted to strengthen and increase the common views between the JP, the NAP 
and the NSP. They strongly supported the idea that "Turkish nationalism cannot 
be a matter of any individual party; on the contrary, Turkish nationalists should 
work hard in making their views predominant in all other parties".2° For them 
the NAP was just first among the equals. In accordance with this argument they 
supported the National Front governments in the 1970s. They also supported the 
military regime and the Motherland Party in 1980s in accordance with the same 
perspective. 
In those years, when the stability in Turkey seemed to be in danger, the 
Hearth helped nationalists and Islamists to unite their views around Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis, which they see as ''the source of personality and even the 
existence of Turkish people and Turkish nation2i.'. The Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis version which was developed by the founders of the hearth, forms the 
basis of their understanding of Turkish politics. In this sense the hearth publishes 
books and periodicals to spread the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse and in 
their opinion this helps the intellectual development of the right. Muharrem 
Ergin's Tiirkiye 'nin Bugiinkii Meseleleri, ibrahim Kafesoglu's Turk Islam 
Sentezi are the most known books. In addition to these, many periodicals are 
published such as Deak Ara§tzrma ve b1celeme Dergisi, Aydmlar Ocagz Biilteni. 
Terciiman and Ortadogu are the most known dailies which give support to 
20 Timuroglu, Turk, 140. 
21 Giiven9 and ct al. Turk-Islam, 189. 
13 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and Intellectuals' Hearth in the 1970s and 1980s.22 It 
can be argued that it was influential in constructing rightist public opinion by 
organizing conferences, meetings, seminars, congresses, colloquiums on various 
subjects of Turkish politics and by publishing books and periodicals. 
In terms of the relation between the Hearth and the 1980 Military 
Regime, they supported the latter unconditionally by stressing Turkey's 
characteristics as being a military-nation and they made a special effort to have 
good relations with the army. In 1982 when it was prohibited to propose any 
plan on behalf of institutions, they had the privilege to give hearth's 
constitutional draft to the National Security Council. The Intellectuals' Hearth's 
founders later claimed that 75-80 % of the 1982 Constitution was the same as 
their draft. 23 
In order to understand the place and importance of the Hearth, it is 
necessary to see the main arguments of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis version 
which made the Intellectuals' Hearth famous. 
22 Copeaux, Tarih, 58. 
23 Gilven~ and et al, Turk-Islam, 154. 
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2.3. Turkish-Islamic Synthesis 
From the 1980s onwards the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse,24 
which was put forward by the Intellectuals' Hearth, became the main instrument 
and symbol of the hearth and of right-wing intellectuals. It is important to that 
the attempt to form a synthesis between Turkish, Islamic and Western values 
goes back to the times of Ottoman Empire. Ziya GOkalp, for instance, is 
accepted as the father of such views. Kemalism is also accepted as a synthesis 
effort since the roots of its nationalism premises in the arguments of Ziya 
Gokalp. Taha Parla puts the difference between the various syntheses as the 
stress on either factor and/or their order. For example in Kemalism the Islam 
factor is minimized, while others -namely Turkish and the West- are valued 
more.25 
After the 1970s Turkish-Islamic Synthesis would be dominant besides 
the ideology shaped during 1930s, there would be a move from one discourse to 
other. Since the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis does not belong to a certain political 
group or party it is not easy to examine this political current. Its discourse is 
produced by different belongings which differ from each other in terms of 
24 It is called a discourse because it didn't pro,ide a deep analysis for bringing different 
synthesis versions together, it only formed ideological identity bases and a political argument. 
Bora characterizes the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as an eclectic and vulgar discourse rather 
than a coherent theory. See Bora, Tantl/ Kemal Can, Dev/et, 161. 
25 Parla, Turkiye 'nin, 217. 
15 
referring Kemalism or Islam more or less as their sources. Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis is evidently expressed in many books, newspapers or cultural 
magazines, but its ideas are only expressed in a veiled way in the educational or 
academic history discourse. Their relations with the political power was not 
clear neither. Although it is not possible to argue that it became a state ideology 
it can be argued that it penetrated to the discourses produced by some state 
institutions. 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis can be defined partly as an anti-Western 
reaction. Although there is an emphasis on Islam, instead of limiting itself with 
the values in the Koran, it aims to tum back to the "national culture" which is 
seen as a synthesis of Turks own past and Islam. According to these views Islam 
is senior than Turkish culture and without it Turkish culture could not live. On 
the other hand, Turkish culture protected and strengthened Islam, if Turkish 
culture was not there Islam would become atrophied. In accordance with this 
approach, Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse is heavily based on history and 
especially on the history of periods and places Turks and Islam came face to face 
namely Aral-Caspian region, Iran-Afghanistan plateau, 9-11 century Anatolia.26 
In order to understand the version put forward by Intellectuals' Hearth, it 
would be beneficial to see their reaction to group called "humanists". After the 
death of Atatiirk we witness the rise of a history writing called "humanist" and 
~6 ~ Copeaux, Tarih, 56. 
16 
which oppose Kemalist history writing (but without denying Kemalism) and 
turns its face to the West. The nationalist opposition to the humanists criticized 
-
their Westemizm and created Turkish-Islamic Synthesis version based on the 
Asian and Muslim characteristics of Turkish history.27 The "humanist" 
movement continue its presence in some of the school textbooks until the end of 
1986, then it leaves its place to the new history perspective which forms a 
synthesis between Kemalism, nationalism and Islam. 
So it is a nationalist ideology which defines Turkish personality through 
Islam which is a religious, ethic and identity based source. However supporters 
of this synthesis do not want to establish a theocratic power. 28 The theoreticians 
of the "synthesis" agree fully with Kemalism in giving back the belief to Turkish 
personality, but their attitude towards "humanist" period is rigid. According to 
them these are the lost years in which Western view (that is made official by 
RPP) became dominant. 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis of the Hearth is seen as an attempt to form a 
common platform between the NAP's and the NSP's versions and the official 
synthesis. Its success stems from the fact that authoritarian regime design it 
presented on the basis of this discourse corresponds to the military regime's 
ideological support and legitimization needs. In other words the Turkish-Islamic 
27 ibid, 54. 
28 
"Just as in Europe Christian values formed the bases of some conservative currents, here 
Islam also is integrated to the politics." ibid 57. 
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Synthesis discourse in any case emerged as an alternative to the existing 
ideology, namely Kemalism. It is not against Kemalism, on the contrary it 
accepts all the principles of Atatiirk. 
Turk Kultiiriinii Ara§tzrma Enstitiisii (Research Institute for Turkish 
Culture) and its publication Turk Kiilturii played an important role in the 
dissemination of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse.29 But main arguments of 
the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis can be found in the book, Tiirkiye 'nin Bugiinka 
Meseleleri (The Problems of Turkey Today) written by Muharrem Ergin. In this 
book Ergin identifies Turkey's problems under the following headings: survival, 
political tranquillity, economic development, the dominance of reason and 
science, and national education. The last one is the most important because of its 
implications for all other problems. In his opinion, since the national education 
has been ruined the dominance of reason and science can not be established, so 
economic development can not be achieved; since the problem of economic 
development is not solved there is no political tranquillity and stability; and 
because of the absence of political stability, Turkey now faces the danger of 
vanishing. 30 
Ergin continues by claiming that the reason for the crisis of national 
education in Turkey, which is the cause of the economic and political crisis 
29 ibid, 55. 
30 Muharrem Ergin, Tilrkiye 'nin Bugiinka Afese/eleri, (istanbul:Aydmlar Ocagi Yaymlan, 
1973), 388. 
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generally, is '1he spoilt intellectuals31". The solution is the nationalization of 
education, which mean teaching students the features of national culture 
intensively. He lists the elements in the nationalization of education as being the 
Turkish language, customs and traditions, a nationalist world view, religion, art 
and history.32 The worldview should cover various subjects ranging from loyalty 
to the state and the military. Students have to be taught that individuals can only 
live under the authority of a state and obedience to state authority is a virtue. 33 
He emphasizes that Turkish nation is a military nation and military should 
live in the best conditions, even though the civilian population is living in worse 
conditions, because the army is united with the Turkish nation. Every individual 
should take pains to ensure that there is no single opposition between army and 
the nation. 34 
On the subject of religion Ergin states that, as a vital element of national 
culture, religion should be protected from every attack and abuse and it should 
be penetrated into every individual's mind. 35 This is one of the points of 
differentiation between Kemalism and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. In the former 
there is no mention of there is any mention of religion in constituting of national 
identity. Mustafa Kemal explains the absence of religion in the concept of 
31 By "spoilt intellectuals" Turkish-Islamic S)nthesis supporters mean either the leftist or 
humanist intellectuals. See ibrahim Kafesoglu, Tiirk Islam Sentezi (istanbul: Aydmlar Ocagi, 
1985), 53. 
32 Ergin, Turkiye 'nin, 389. 
33 Kafesoglu, Turk Islam, 53. 
34 Ergin, Turkiye 'nin, 390. 
35 ibid, 388-400. 
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culture as follows: "Turks were a great nation also before they accepted Islam as 
their religion. After they did so, . . . it caused to loosen the national bonds of 
Turkish people, it also diminished their national feelings and excitements. "36 
On the other hand according to the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, Islam is 
the best suiting religion to the Turkish nation and this is why Turks accepted 
Islam, as if they had found the religion they had been looking for. However, 
Islam is only one of the elements of Turkish national culture. Another important 
figure in the Intellectuals' Hearth, ibrahim Kafesoglu emphasizes Turks superior 
characteristic as being the first law making nation, the power to administer the 
whole world and gives another reason for Turks being integrated with Islam as 
the need of Islamic world for them. In his book Turkish Islamic Synthesis 
Kafesoglu argues that Islam had been re-strengthened by the power of Turks at 
a time of weakness because of divisions among Muslims. Turks not only saved 
Islam but also developed it. Kafesoglu claims that the practice of secularism is 
first seen in Turkish history and they carried this secularism into Islam.37 
Muharrem Ergin states another main feature of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis 
discourse as Turkish history should be taught from the very beginning as a proof 
of advanced Turkish national culture. 38 According to trus understanding teaching 
only the national rustory is adequate for rustory education. 
36 Levent Koker, Modenle~me, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi, (istanbul:ileti~im Ya)'1nlan, I 993), 
152-153. 
37 Kafesoglu, Turk Islam, 176-182, 193, 198. 
38 Ergin, Tiirkiye 'nin, 401-402. 
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As to the function of religion in this synthesis, Siileyman Seyfi Ogun 
argues that as in the case of Kemalism it is clear religion would help Kemalism 
as a second ideological tool in the ideological homogenization of citizens, in the 
de-politicization of society and in the prevention of pluralistic politics. Kemalism 
and Islam, two worldviews that are impossible to reconcile, can still be used 
functionally as the bases of an authoritarian state. 39 
All these efforts to reconcile Islam and Kemalism are the signs of the 
desire of founders to prove that they are not against Kemalism. According to 
Ergi~ the most important characteristic of Atatiirk's period was the praise of 
"national culture". But later on "cosmopolitan intellectuals" replaced it with 
humanism. The very reason for the crisis of pre-12 September is that the national 
cultural policies were not followed, which meant that the condition for being a 
nation state was not fulfilled. Ergin sees the 1980 intervention as an opportunity, 
which may not occur again and argues that it is the turning point in order to, re-
establish the dominance of the national culture and achieve the Second 
Renaissance after Atatiirk's Renaissance in Turkey.40 
In order to achieve this Turkish Renaissance and to form the basis for the 
solution of urgent problems "political tranquillity" has to be achieved. In this 
discourse, although there was full political tranquillity during Atatiirk's period, it 
was destroyed because democracy in Turkey was practiced wrongly. In this 
39 S. Seyfi Ogo.n, Modernle~me, Milliyet~ilik ve Turkiye, (istanbul: Baglam Yay.,1995), 188. 
40 Ergin, Turkiye 'nin, 213. 
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failure the national culture's loss of hegemonic position has an important place. 
For Ergin, democracy means the national will and national will means national 
culture. Thus in order to say that a government or a regime as democratic 
national culture must stand at the center of politics. 41 In this sense according to 
Ergin 1980 coup d'etat was an intervention to re-establish a democracy on the 
basis of national culture. There are also some other factors for the wrong 
practice of democracy. Bora argues that these factors and the regime design 
based on these factors are completely legitimizing the political regime that 
military regime tried to institutionalize.42 
The leading figures of the Intellectuals' Hearth supported even the mostly 
criticized characteristic of 1982 Constitution, which is limiting the civil and 
political liberties of the citizens. In Muharrem Ergin's opinion; 
In Turkey there is the problem of freedom. The fight for freedom, which 
emerged as a threat freedom against state, authority and social order is 
only an affectation poisoning democracy. Turkey has suffered not from 
the absence of freedom but from its abuse. 43 
Ergin claims that the 1982 Constitution satisfies Turkey's all needs for a 
century. According to Ergin and other ideologues of Intellectuals' Hearth, every 
individual country has a unique political practice that suits its society. The 
existence of a parliament and the change of government through free elections 
are a sufficient condition to prove the existence of democracy. In terms of the 
41 ibid. 230. 
42 Bora Tami/ Kernal Can, Devlet, 165. 
43 Ergin, Tiirkiye 'nin, 220. 
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West part of the synthesis, hearth members suggest to take the technology and 
civilization in the light of reason and logic. Accordingly they argue for "true 
Kemalism" in which nationalism is the core. Ziya Gokalp is accepted as the 
father of Atatilrk's "Turkish cultural nationalism". They isolate civilization and 
culture concepts on the basis of Gokalp's differentiation44 and disregard the 
relations and activation between them. 
In short, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse's practical meaning 
doesn't rest in the comprehensiveness ofits uniting the three factors but rather in 
uniting the synthesis efforts with an authoritarian rhetoric and with the famous 
fear theme of 12 September regime and of military officers generally that 
"Turkey is surrounded with enemies from all directions." Among these enemies 
even the Asian-African countries and United Nations organization are listed. 45 
ibrahim Kafesoglu says "Turks, who are facing substantial dangers, need a 
courageous development and a movement based on conviction. ,'46 
This emphasis on 'enemies' is consistent with the chauvinistic 
understanding of being Turkish and the conception of national culture as the 
motor of history. Turkish culture is "one of the few great cultures that exist on 
earth, and it created a form of society which gives direction to world history. 
According to Muharrem Ergin the most important characteristic of Turkish 
44 Taha Parla, Ziya Gokalp, Kemalizm ve Turkiye 'de Korporatism (istanbul: ileti~im 
Ya)1nlan, 1993), 54-72. 
45 Ergin., Tiirkiye 'nin. 74-76. 
46 Copeaux, Tarih, 57. 
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culture is its success in establishing a state, which he perceives as the most 
important activity of human societies. He argues that this characteristic is 
sufficient for proving the universal superiority of Turkish national culture. Turks 
had established more than one hundred states, more than any other nations in 
history, and they are the only nation who succeeded in having a state for two 
thousand years uninterruptedly. 47 According to this view since the history of 
humanity is a struggle of national cultures, all political and social developments 
are perceived within the framework of the war of national cultures to affect and 
to resist each other. In this sense culture is the national security concern of a 
nation, which comes before anything else. 48 
For the supporters of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, because education plays 
a vital role in the development of a nation, it is obvious that Turkey's 
development and rise can be achieved first by solving the problems of national 
education and its reformation. There has to be a national cultural policy along 
with the economic policy pursued by Turkey. Thus there is a need for a national 
culture policy which will evaluate, determine and preserve national integrity and 
unity in Turkey where there is cultural imperialism in which the national and 
spiritual value judgments are wanted to be destroyed by fanatic ideologies. 
The main problem is accepted as the need to make national education 
and cultural policies the instruments of Turkey's development in the economic 
47 Ergin, TfJrkiye 'nin. 27-28. 
48 ibid., 33; Bora TaruV Kemal Can, Dev/et, 163. 
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and social spheres. The desired development has to be based on a policy in 
which economic and cultural elements complete each other. The magical power 
that allows nations to survive and develop stems from the mix and combination 
of national and spiritual values in the same basket. In this sense healthy, positive 
and efficient national education and cultural policies are necessary for national 
survival. Education represents the values that make one nation different from 
others. 
Accordingly if the Turkish nation is left in the hands of a generation that 
1s deprived of national consciousness and national culture, admirer of 
imperialism and various ideologies (i.e. Communism, Socialism), it would 
become a society that is open to every threat of destruction. Turkey's future 
existence will be in secure hands if young people are aware of the national 
culture and the national history. 49 
2.4. N eo-Kemalism and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis 
Intellectuals' Hearth sees the reason of crisis of the 1970s as having 
material, moral and spiritual causes. As mentioned above according to the 
Hearth members, every national education relies on a national culture. Thus the 
49 ismet Binark. "Milli E~tim ve Kiiltiir Politikanuz Ozerine ~iinceler", Ankara Aydmlar 
Oca~1 Biilteni. Sa~1 3-4, (Temrnuz-Arahk 1987), 6-8. 
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point of support for Turkey naturally has to be Turkish culture. One of the basic 
foundations of Turkish culture and its moral essence is the Muslim faith. If there 
is not this element in our worldview that would direct all of our affairs and 
national education, then there is no possibility of counting that view as a national 
one. 5° Culture that is the basis of state also requires obedience. 51 
The state understanding of the Intellectuals' Hearth as "being pious but 
not religious" was institutionalized during the 1980 military regime and 
Motherland Party governments while the members of the National Security 
Council was still in power although it was transformed into the Council of 
Presidency. In other words the influence of the discourse framed within the 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was strengthened over the official rhetoric while the 
officers were still in power though behind the curtains. However this should not 
lead us to conclude that the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis had permanent ideological 
hegemony in Turkish politics in the 1980s. The military's tendency was to utilize 
some of its elements rather than depend solely on it. 
On the other hand the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis did not achieve the 
initial purpose of integrating the two extreme points of Turkish rightist political 
discourse, which was the raison d'etre of the Intellectuals' Hearth. It could not 
bring together the political traditions on ideological grounds that it claimed to 
50 S. Gokdemir, "Ahlak Dersleri'', Ocak Ara~mna ve inceleme Dergisi. Sa)1 JO, (Nisan 
1974), 12-14. 
51 Siik:ni Er, "Milli Kiiltiir ve Milli Birlik Ozerine" Ankara Aydmlar Ocaga Biilteni. Sa)1 2, 
(Haziran 1987), 3-6. 
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compose in the same box neither tied them politically. Ideologically its high 
eclecticism was an obstacle while politically the reason was that their highly 
reliance on military regime created a reaction among people. Therefore the 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis couldn't become a ground for political unification of 
NSP/WP's Islamic movement and NAP/NWP's nationalist movement. 
In short this "ideology" emphasizes joining Turkish nationalism and 
Islam as the only viable channel for creating a strong Turkey. In addition, the 
Synthesis identifies various enemies of social culture who need to be eliminated. 
These are atheists, separatists and Western humanists, members of other 
religions, those who blame Islam for the collapse of Ottoman Empire, and leftist, 
elitist and etatist intellectuals. The synthesis envisions a coalition of with the 
military. 52 
According to the followers of the Hearth, the Westernization of the 
Turkish culture was realized by some cultural institutions the national education, 
radio-television and Tilrk Dil Kurumu (Turkish Language Institution). For this 
reason they demanded from state a tougher control over these institutions in 
May 1980.53 1980 Military Coup D'etat did not damage Intellectuals' Hearth, on 
the contrary their accomplishments were appreciated by the new regime which 
officialized religion's place in the society by strengthening Kemalist on the one 
52Birol Ye~ilada, "Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East" in The Political and 
Socio-economic transformation of Turkey, Atilla Eralp and et al (Westport: Praeger, 1993), 
177. 
53 Gtiven~ and et al, Turk-Islam, 187-194. 
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hand, by making religious lessons compulsory at every level of schools on the 
other hand. In 1983, State Planning Organization (SPO) proposed a "national 
culture report" in order to increase and make continuous the state control over 
cultural policy. On the other hand in 1986 Atatiirk Kiiltiir, Di/ ve Tarih Yiiksek 
Kuromu (Atatilrk Culture, Language and History Higher Institution, established 
by 1982 Constitution) followed a policy which was interpreted as the acceptance 
of the ideas oflntellectuals' Hearth by the media of the time. s4 
The military in Turkey have always been one of the central institutions of 
the Republican elite and a traditional and uncompromising stronghold of secular 
and territorial nationalism. With the turbulent experience of the 1970s at the 
back of their minds, however; the military elite conceived Islam as a major 
instrument for promoting social and political stability. Consequently, they 
favored legislation within the broad framework of what is known as the 
"Turkish-Islamic synthesis", a mixture of nationalism and Islam, as a firm barrier 
against potential sources of instability. ss 
It is generally accepted that there is a positive relation between Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis and the 1980 military regime. At least there are many 
similarities between the policies of officers and the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. As 
Tami Bora has argued, a positive relationship between the hearth and the 
54 The tex1 of the 1983 National Culture Report can be seen in the Giiven9 and et al, Tilrk-
Js/am, 48-68; the report accepted by the AKDTYK is also in the same book, 69-111. 
ss Oni~, "The political", 747. 
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military regime can not be explained only by the argument that the former is 
''using Kemalism as a tool". 56 According to the Intellectuals' Hearth members, 
Atatiirk's period is the time of happiness. They argue that Atatiirk was the 
greatest Turkish nationalist, a strong anti-Communist and a realist Turanist. 
Their support for Atatilrk and his period is based on the idea of "Atatiirk as the 
best Turkish nationalist" and the belief that "during his period the state took 
national culture as its basis,57 as opposed to leftists. According to the Hearth 
members the "proxy authority", that shapes and sets a course for social structure 
and process, takes its legitimacy from being in accordance with national culture. 
This is the motor of history, and thus devotion to national culture is a sufficient 
condition for political authority to be legitimate. Thus Kemalist authoritarianism, 
which identifies people's will with the nation and the nation's will with the state, 
materializing language, history and cultural unity in itself, 58 has common 
ideological factors with this argument. 59 
2.4.J. Jdeological Rhetoric 
Bora claims that, the most practical benefit that the Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis provided to the 12 September regime was its articulation of Islam as 
56 Bora, Tami I K. Can, Dev/et, 161. 
57 Ergin, Tiirkiye 'nin, 24-25; Bora, TaruV Kemal Can, Dev/et. 154. 
58 Koker, Modernle!jme, 115-117. 
59 Bora, TaruV Kemal Can, Dev/et, 156. 
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part of the official ideology. Since it proposes a synthesis without decreasing the 
importance of Turkish and West factors, its convergence with official ideology 
was made easier. The meaning of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse according 
to Intellectuals' Hearth is a Turkish-Islamic-Western synthesis. It doesn't 
eliminate the West, to the extent that the technological, economic, political and 
military alliances are not disregarded. It is also stated that Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis is a new formula in terms of its installation rather than its elements. 
Neither can it be regarded as new in terms of serving the purpose of legitimizing 
and strengthening the various elements of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state 
tradition. 60 In . this sense Abdurrahman Dilipak defines this synthesis as 
''Kemalism-Islam synthesis.61 
After 1980 almost all parts of the political spectrum, except for 
revolutionary socialists and radical Muslims, tried to bring forward the points 
that can reconcile Islam with Kemalist ideology and they even tried to be the 
dominant one in the designation of official interpretation of Kemalism. 62 Thus, 
the domination of Kemalism over social, political and cultural life in Turkey, 
which reached a totalitarian level during the officers regime in 1980. However 
there were various versions of Kemalism and changes in these versions. Because 
the version that army adopted, deprived military regime of an integrated and 
60 ibid, 161. 
61 Quoted in ibid, 161-162. 
62 ibid, 149. 
30 
coherent doctrinal equipment, there occurred a necessity to use Kemalism in 
conformity with the new regime's needs. Along this necessity an authoritarian-
extreme rightist version of Kemalism emerged. However since Kemalism was a 
"cold" official ideology which became identical with the state authority, its 
ability to form the ideological ground for a civilian-social agreement was very 
limited. The rapid politicization and ideological struggle of the 1960-80 period in 
Turkey created an accumulation that made the obtaining of ideological 
hegemony difficult. 63 
It is also true that as a negative factor, this hegemony crisis, together 
with the de-politicization and social weariness on the eve of 12 September, was 
in favor of military regime. Whereas military regime lacked a positive factor that 
would form a popular ideological activism and communication tool, the organic 
support of a civilian institutional or social power. This weakness signified the 
absence of a massive and popular ideological consent as well as the inability of 
officers to establish an ideological hegemony. Military regime removed this 
obstacle by including religion in the official ideological equipment. The Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis discourse of Intellectuals' Hearth, which had acquired the 
greatest harmony with military regime, was effective in terms of satisfying this 
need.64 
63 ibid, 147. 
64 ibid, 148. 
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In one of his speeches for promoting the new Constitution General Evren 
stated his ideas on the secularism principle as follows: 
One of the main principles of our republic founded by Atatiirk is 
secularism. Secularism is not religious enmity. (Before 1980) Turkish 
children could not have any information about the religion of Turkish 
nation, their families, their parents. This religious information can not be 
taught at home. If parents try this is not a proper action. Because parents 
may teach wrong, defect things or they can teach only their 
understanding of religion... We made religious courses compulsory at 
schools. 65 
He believes that by introducing compulsory religious courses at primary 
schools he is contributing to secularism. Because according to him "secularism 
does not mean to deprive Turkish youth, Turkish citizens of religious knowledge 
and leave them (weak against abuses) to be deceived and mislead."66 But 
according to General Evren the ''true" religious education can be given only by 
state. These views are in conformity with the Islam understanding of Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis. 
2.4.2. Education 
The officers came to the power with the claim that Turkey was in a 
political, social and economic crisis which was not being dealt with properly by 
65£,Ten, Kenan Evren 'in, vol:3, 309 
66ibid, 309-310. 
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the civilian authorities. inal argues that the officers believed the pre-1980 social 
and political crisis resulted from Western democratic values.67 His argument is 
true in the sense that the officers' regime either suspended or destroyed many 
democratic institutions with the claim of bringing social order. There has been 
given a large place to conservative values intensively against the democratic 
values and structures. 68 These are all similar to the arguments of Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis discourse. 
Kemal inal states that after 12 September 1980, education as an 
institution in general and textbooks specifically were attributed the ideological 
reproduction instrument role. 69 
The Intellectuals' Hearth argued for compulsory religious lessons in the 
secondary schools and also in the prisons, in the army and factories in 1981. 70 
The officers adopted an approach that valued religion as a factor providing unity 
and entirety for the society. This fact is symbolized by the Constitutional 
guarantee for compulsory religious lessons in secondary schools and by the 
frequent references to the Koran in the public appearances of the head of the 
National Security Council. The preamble of the 1982 Constitution refers to the 
67Kemal inal, Egitimde ideo/ojik Boyut, (Ankara: Doruk Yay., 1996), 22. 
68 Timuroglu.. Turk. 138-140. 
69 Inal, Egitimde, /18. 
70 Bolay, S. Hayri, quoted in Bora, Tanll/ Kemal Can, Dev/et, 174. 
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expression of '"holly religious feelings". Such expressions are the reflections of 
the influence of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is in the constitution. 
2.4.3. Cultural Policy 
Gilveny examines a case important for showing the Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis discourse's assimilation into the official ideology and its acceptance by 
the anny, perceiving itself as the guarantor of official ideology. In the above 
mentioned report, accepted by the Atatiirk, Language and History High Council, 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was proposed as the framework for the official 
national cultural policy and religion was accepted as the uniting factor of the 
nation. 71 Bora notes that while it is not possible to argue that this proposal was 
accepted at all levels of Kemalist civilian and military bureaucracy, it is 
important even as an attempt. He also points to the influence of US-NATO 
political strategy in thinking of integrating Islam and the official ideology. This 
strategy valued moderate Islam as a weapon against Soviet expansionism in the 
Middle East in late 1970s. n 
The report on national culture prepared by the State Planning Office in 
1983 also reflected this Islamic policy. It emphasized Atatiirk's directive that the 
~ 1 Gilven~ and et al, Turk-Islam, 69. 
12 Bora, TamV Kemal Can, Dev/et, 177-178. 
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"Turkish nation should be pious".73 On the other hand Ogun argues that this 
report had a collective characteristics, just as the report prepared by the RRP 
government in 1979 did. He points out that while the former aims at preserving 
national, spiritual and holy values, the latter aims at the modernization of 
Turkish society. However, in the last instance both reports wanted to be a guide 
and orientated the culture rather than leaving it into the hands of society. 74 
2. 4. 4. Evaluation 
The perspectives on relations between the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis of 
Intellectuals' Hearth and the ideology of the 1980 military regime can be divided 
into components. One argues that religion was used as a tool by the officers to 
reach their ends and so political Islam was strengthened. The other viewpoint 
argues that this process was not a novelty on the contrary, it was a continuation 
of traditional state-religion relations in Turkey. 
Taha Parla's argument is an example of the first group. According to 
Parla the military regime's policies such as compulsory religion courses damaged 
the secular character of the Turkish state. Accordingly Turkey, after 1980, 
'
3 Guvenc and et al., TiJrk-/s/am, 147. 
74 O&in. Modernle§me, 188. 
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lagged behind the 1920s in terms of secularism. Religion was elevated again by 
the state in the 1980 Constitution. After the 1980 coup d'etat there was a 
conscious political-ideological intervention in order to strengthen the position of 
religion in the state and society. According to Parla there is a social project and 
political plan for this. He claims that, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is not a real 
nationalist pro-independence movement nor it represents a fundamentalist 
Islamist stance against the Western camp like NSP, but is in fact a Turkish-
Islamic-NATO Synthesis designed to stop democratic and leftist developments 
in Turkey.75 In this view the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is known as the 
formulation of a movement which aims to give intellectual, ideological and 
institutional support to the 1980 Military Regime. 
On the other hand, although Ogun accepts the positive relation between 
the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and military regime he opposes the presentation of 
the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, as a conspiracy theory. He argues that the 
criticisms of the Intellectuals' Hearth and its Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse 
go beyond the ideological support given to the military coups and is carried to 
another platform such as "the distortion of Kemalism". Again within the same 
argument it is claimed that Kemalism's secularism principle was damaged by the 
Intellectuals' Hearth and discourse. Ogun prefers to explain the historical 
background of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and to discuss it within the limits of 
;s Parla, Tilrkiye 'nin, 217-221. 
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Turkish culture. He thinks that this synthesis is an eclecticism between 
nationalism and religion. This eclecticism can be found in other Muslim countries 
as well as Christian countries such as Poland. 76 
Ogun states that the historical background of the synthesis is goes back 
to thinkers and authors such as Ziya Gokalp and Peyami Safa. However the 
literature on Turkish nationalism, which includes the coincidence of religion and 
nationalism, is a rich one. He claims that in essence Kemalist modernist policies 
are based on a very traditionalist method: the control of religion by state. 77 It can 
be claimed that Kemalism continued many Ottoman traditions in general. The 
Ottomans used official Islam as a legitimization power, similarly Kemalism used 
the Directorate of Religious Affairs under its control in the modernization 
affairs. Here religious control should be treated in a wider perspective as being 
directed towards the control of "individual wills". Starting from the 1940s the 
state's view on religion became more moderate; sometimes covertly and 
sometimes openly the process of Islamization began. An inseparable dimension 
of this process is the Islamization ofKemalism. 
Starting out from the idea that ''Kemalism was understood wrongly" the 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis claims that Kemalism, in essence, tolerated Islam and 
even argues that Mustafa Kemal was a good Muslim believer. The efforts of 
Evren during the military regime to base Kemalism on Islam was not original. 
76 ()gun, Modernle~e. 178. 
77 ibid, 181. 
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These themes can be seen even during the DP government. What the 
Intellectuals' Hearth did was to sustain this populism of the DP. The 
Intellectuals' Hearth is the statist right wing group which wanted to popularize 
Jacobean Kemalism by using Islam. These can be called legal rights populists. 
Their ideological bases of Turkism go back to the 19th Century. The struggle 
against the Tanzimat's "extreme pro-Westernism" is now directed by pro-
synthesis people against Kemalist Westernism. In addition to this, the pro-
synthesis intellectuals' intensive opposition to Communism during the Cold War 
was articulated on the Pan-Slavism fears inherited from Turkists. The 
relationship that they established between nationalism and religion is not very 
different from the relation established by Turkists. Their legitimization bases are 
intense statism and the Islamic and militarist interpretations of Kemalism. 78 
When it is seen from this perspective it can be claimed that the 
Intellectuals' Hearth and its activities are not strange to Turkish politics' cultural 
reality, the bases of which can be found in the Ottoman Empire and which 
acquired continuity in the republican policies. Then one can ask what the 
difference is. According to Ogun, the difference is between Jaconbinism and 
populism and way of expression. When it is seen in terms of instruments it 
would be seen that both policies are coinciding. This point of coincidence is 
guardianship and imposition from top against the individual initiatives. 79 
78 Timuroglu, Tiirk, 138-140; Ogun, Modernle§me, 186-187. 
79 Ogun, Modernle§me, 188. 
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Jacobean Kemalists keep the pro-synthesis groups on the agenda. They 
defined themselves as being in an ideological-cultural war with them. 80 Religion 
is one of the points of sharp debates between the two Kemalist groups. The 
Jacobean Kemalist elite sees religion as the very reason of social backwardness 
while populist elite see it as the focus and source of national culture. 81 
The fear psychology of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is explained above. In 
Ogun's opinion, in Turkey fear has an important place in the raison d'etre of 
most of the political perspectives. This is also true for the two groups mentioned 
above. Jacobean Kemalists' fears focus on the pro-synthesis intellectuals. 
Populist Kemalists' fears are focused on the neo-Byzantians. These fears are 
based on conspiracy theories. 82 These fears also explain the xenophobia of 
Intellectuals' Hearth. 
2.5. Conclusion 
The September 12, 1980 coup d'etat altered not only the Turkish 
economy and societal structure but the political system and external relations as 
well. The meanings of right and left, of modernity and backwardness, and of 
Turkishness were completely revised. 
so ibid. 192. 
81 ibid, 189. 
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The grand strategy of the military regime, despite its all rhetoric about 
the maintenance and further development of the secular Kemalist ideology, was 
to counterbalance the revolutionary leftist forces by providing support to 
Islamist views. Of course this operation was not overt but carried out insidiously 
with the idea that a right-wing social force, outside the boundaries of the state, 
had to be activated to provide a secure basis for conservative forces in the long 
run. 83 The military regime did not target Islamic forces, but on the contrary it 
tolerated them. 
82 ibid, 19 l. 
83Tiinay, "New Right's", 20. 
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CHAPTER ill 
THE RELATION BETWEEN THE IDEOLOGY AND EDUCATION 
POLICY 
History is a field of war. People who rebel against the authority 
and the ones who try to suppress this revolt try to have the support 
of history with them ... Today the dominant history interpretation of 
the political power penetrates everywhere through textbooks, 
media and television. 84 
John Tosh 
3.1. The History Education and Ideology In General 
If scholastic knowledge is examined as a social product, it suggests a 
great deal about the society that produces and uses it. It reveals which groups 
have power and demonstrates that the views of these groups are expressed and 
legitimized in the school curriculum. It can also identify social groups that are 
not empowered by the economic and social patterns in society and do not have 
their views, activities, and priorities represented in the school curriculum. 
Omissions, stereotypes, and distortions that remain in "updated" social studies 
textbook accounts of such groups reflect the relative powerlessness of these 
84 John Tosh. Tarihin Pe~inde, (istanbul: Ttirkiye Ekonornik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfi 
Yaymlan, 1997), 11. 
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groups. 85 Despite many changes in curriculum content, an underlying concern 
for the perspectives of the dominant groups generally remains. In other words 
the basic ideology is not been altered for so many years. Thus one can talk about 
a continuity over generations of students. 
The school curriculum contributes to the formation of attitudes that 
make it easier for powerful groups, those whose knowledge is legitimized by 
school studies, to manage and control society. Textbooks not only express the 
dominant groups' ideologies, but also help to form attitudes in support of their 
social position. Indeed the importance of ideology to the power of dominant 
groups increases as the use of overt social coercion declines. In the twentieth 
century, the authority of tradition and the legitimacy of visible methods of 
control, such as force, have diminished. Governments and other powerful groups 
increasingly justify their activities by appeals to 'reason', to the logic of 
evidence, and to the consent of populations, the public is ostensibly called upon 
to make intelligent choices. 
Inasmuch as social choices are likely to be made on the basis of social 
knowledge and symbolic meanings that are available, what one knows about 
social groups and processes is central to one's decisions. The perceived 
legitimacy of certain ideas increases their acceptance and utilization. Social 
agencies, such as the schools, the media, and government, whose functions 
85 Jean Anyon. "Ideology and United States History Te~1books" in Conflict of Interests: The 
Politics of American Education (New York and London: Longman. 1988), 32 
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include the dissemination of information are major sources of knowledge that is 
both available and socially approved. If the views embedded in the information 
disseminated by these agencies predispose people to accept some values and not 
others, and exclude some choices as unacceptable, then they provide invisible 
intellectual, internalized, and perhaps unconscious boundaries to social choice. 
These boundaries are a basis for social management and control. 
On the other hand political history deals with all the social factors that 
are related to the official power structure. The establishment here refers to the 
"state". Political history includes the institutional organization of state, the 
struggle between factions and parties for taking the control of state, the policies 
imposed by state and the relations between states. For many people these titles 
form all of the domain of the discipline called as history. 
Historically, state is also interested in history writing. On the one hand, 
the political power or the people struggling for it, resorted to the old times to 
see how they can best achieve their objectives. At the same time political elites 
thought that it is to their interest to present a history version which would 
legitimize their position to masses, they did this either by articulating their past 
successes or by revealing how old that the institutional structure on which their 
power is based. The rise and fall of statesmen or nations and empires are the 
subjects dealt and explained in an impressive and dramatical way. 86 
86 Tosh. Tarihin, 14-15. 
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History textbook illustrates one way of imposing beliefs and constraining 
choice. Textbooks offer concrete examples and thus substantive instruction in 
past 'success' and 'failure' in social, economic and political matters. 
Governmental reforms are characterized as successful methods of social 
recourse, whereas confrontation and opposition are depicted as failures. 
Evidence of what constitutes success or failure, whether or not it coincides with 
actual fact, provides a compelling guide for making choices today. 87 
Social meanings in school history can contribute to management and 
control by the imposition of ideological boundaries, by predisposing some 
choices and not others, legitimating some ideas, activities and groups not others. 
The conceptual legitimacy conferred by school knowledge on powerful social 
groups is metabolized into power that is real when members of society in their 
everyday decisions support -or fail to challenge- prevailing hierarchies. The idea 
that these groups have legitimate social power leads to the expectation that these 
groups deserve our support and contending ones do not. 
State, political party in the power or any kind of suppression way 
whether it is ideological or religious may compel a certain interpretation of the 
past. It is very rare that the textbooks are left outside of any control mechanism. 
Even in the countries where the education is not done on a national scale, 
87 Anyon. "Ideology", 33. 
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education is so much important that state never gives up concerning about the 
contents of the textbooks. 88 
Besides, textbooks are the most read books and they reflect not only the 
ideas of their authors' views but also official, semi-official views or at least a 
perspective on which there is a consensus. Textbooks don't go beyond the 
borders separating the states. The world description in the textbooks does not 
only belong to a state, in general they are for the young people in that state. 
They are widespread; but not much translated to other languages and for this 
reason a discourse that does not have a concern of "how it will reflect the 
country where it is printed." Reader is young and open to different views and 
they do not have a critical stand to accompany these readings. On the contrary 
the rightness of the written material is accepted a priori. 89 
As mentioned above textbook materials are only one of the many 
conveyors of a discourse that can use some other ways such as television. A 
school textbook is a result of a dual discourse: Scientific and social. In terms of 
history, social content has importance because history is one of the courses that 
convey identity discourse. On the other hand its scientific content is formed by 
the reflection of the dominant currents of history writing. So a history textbook 
can be analyzed in terms of these two sides: scientific and social/ideological. In 
terms of its ideological function again there are two main ways of looking at a 
88 Copeaux. Tarih, I. 
89 ibid, 3. 
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textbook: External and internal analysis. External analysis is the examination of 
the production conditions of the textbook discourse. It shows the formation of 
official discourse passing trough various channels; through which law and 
regulation the ideology is conveyed, how the authors reflect the ideology to the 
textbooks. On the other hand the internal analysis examines the discourse of the 
textbooks. 90 
This approach, highlighting the ideological characteristics of what 
schools teach, suggests that political power has had its perspectives legitimiud 
and indicates that school curricula can lay a subjective basis for social control. 
Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from the point of view 
expressed here is that the school curriculum as a major contributor to social and 
political attitudes can be used to change those attitudes. To argue that ideologies 
influence behavior is to accord real power to symbols and symbolic forms in 
education. Just as the school curriculum has hitherto supported patterns of 
power and domination, so it can be used to foster autonomy and social change. 
Social change is intimately connected with changes in available cultural 
symbols and meanings. Although it is true that ideological shifts in the 
curriculum are ultimately a reflection of shifts in social and political power, it is 
90 ibid, 5-6. 
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also true that the availability of ideological alternatives increases the likelihood 
of power shifts and changes. 
3.2. The History Education and Ideology In Turkey In 1980s 
In Turkey history is used in the process of education for the purpose of 
devising material in daily politics and designing history concordant with these.91 
Orhan Kologlu talks about the "presentism" in Turkish history education. 
According to him presentism, meaning writing history for today, writing it as a 
justification/legitimization for today's policies, leads only to political 
polarization.92 The decade of the 1980s has witnessed approaches which try to 
realize the history education in an authoritative way and the historical research in 
a hierarchical order. The influence of this process can still be observed.93 
Neumann thinks that there is a big gap between history courses given at 
schools and the scientific history. After examining "The Purposes of Turkish 
National Education" and "The Principles of Turkish National Education" which 
are defined in the Basic Law of National Education and Decree Having The 
91 Salih Ozbaran, Tarih, Tarihfi ve Top/um, (istanbul: Tiirkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih 
Vakft Yaymlan, 1997). 4. 
92 Orban Kolo@u, "Tarih O~etiminde Bugiinciiliik/Presentism,Yamlsamalar ve Sonuc;:lan", 
in Tarih Ogretimi ve Ders Kitaplan, ed. Salih Ozbaran, (istanbul: Dokuz Eyliil Yay. 1998). 
96. 
93 Ozbaran, Tarih, Tarih~i, 98. 
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Force of Law on the Organization and Duties of Ministry of National 
Education,94 Neumann concludes that existing situation which is subject to many 
criticisms is not contradictory with these officially set objectives. According to 
these laws, the main purpose of the national education is to create individuals 
who are concordant with social norms and who realize their duties and 
responsibilities to the nation. He calls our attention to the fact that the objective 
to "bring up individuals who have the capacity to think freely and scientifically" 
is only secondary in the Basic Law (Article 2.2) while it is not even mentioned in 
the Decree. Both of the laws state that the essential target of education is to 
''bring up citizens who are faithful to Atatiirk's renovations and principles and to 
Atatiirk's nationalism ... , who adopt, protect and develop national, moral, 
humane, spiritual and cultural values of Turkish nation, who love his/her family, 
motherland and nation and who are aware of his/her duties and responsibilities 
to the Turkish Republic ... "95 
In this context, Neumann talks about Nietzsche's three different kinds of 
history writing: monumentalist, antiquaries, critical history. He finds many 
similarities between monumentalist and Turkish history writing at secondary 
schools. The old belief in permanency of greatness and reasons for a great nation 
still remains valid in such a way that the people and periods that were perceived 
94 Milli Egitim Kanunu, Milli Egitim Bakanbg:mm Te~kilat ve Gorevleri Hakkmda Kanun 
Hiikmiinde Karamame. 
95 Cristoph Neumann. "Tarihin Yaran ve Zaran Olarak Tiirk Kimligi: Bir Akademik 
Deneme", in Tarih O~etimi ve Ders Kitaplan, ed. Salih Ozbaran, (istanbul: Dokuz Eyliil 
Yay. 1998), 106-107. 
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as glorious are still talked about as the subject of history courses in the present. 
Since the reasons for greatness are not mentioned monumentalist history is open 
to political manipulation. 96 
Why is there a similarity between Nietzsche's monumentalist history and 
Turkish history education? The reason for this is the common characteristics of 
these texts, which is the assumption that there is one to one correspondence 
between individuals and people and between people and state. 
The Basic Law ofNational Education advocates a kind of individual that 
is completely in accordance with society and state living for these. According to 
the law even the talents and abilities which are peculiar to the individual would 
be presented to the society's advantage directly. When the fundamental 
individual image has such a characteristics, an individual's life is determined by 
the fate of the state and the nation. Individual's identity is hidden in the identity 
of nation and state. In such an environment the history can only have one 
function: to bestow the identity of nation. 97 
Neumann proposes a three-phased periodization for the analysis of the 
history discourse in Turkish identity search: Late Ottoman, early Republican, 
and late Republican periods. According to Neumann during the first period the 
aim of the regime was to preserve the existence of state, while during the second 
period it was to find an identity for the newly established Republic. This was a 
96 ibid, l 08. 
90 ibid, 109. 
49 
non-Ottoman identity. The young Republic which was following a typical nation 
building project applied to the method of Hobsbawm's "invention of tradition" 
and rejected Ottoman period completely. Instead of Ottoman period, Turkish 
Central Asian and general history is put forward. 
Third period is still continuing. An important component of Turkish 
History Thesis is its perception of Turkish history as a peculiar one, which can 
not be compared to any other nation. In this period the paradigm of history 
thesis is opened to discussion. But no paradigm that is valid everywhere was 
created. A group feeling close to Islamic values created Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis arguing "Turkish history is peculiar'' rehabilitated Selchuk and 
Ottoman periods which were neglected before. This is quite clear in the history 
courses under the control of Ministry of National Education.98 
History textbooks stand indecisively between Turkish History Thesis' 
modem version and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. In general the radical arguments 
of these two schools of thought do not take place in textbooks. The historical 
reasons of Turkey's contemporary problems are not mentioned and this is 
natural in the history understanding which is coded for creating and making 
Turkish identity great. 99 
It is true that a political culture can not be created by decrees, but it can 
be manipulated and directed by governmental policies. Our century is full of 
98 ibid, 110. 
99 ibid, 111. 
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cases of "social engineering" aimed at a "legitimization" or "de-legitimization" 
of political systems. Political struggles of ideology and legitimization, in the long 
run and in the large measure boils down to the manipulation of the political 
socialization process. 100 Besides there is ample evidence that not only textbooks, 
but other aspects of education as well, have served as the legitimization tool of 
state. But still the textbooks appear as one of the major tools for ideological 
legitimization of the existing political power, especially when their writing or 
selection among the written ones is done under the control of political power. In 
this respect the textbooks of the "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and 
Atatiirkism" courses have a special importance. Because this course has been 
made compulsory at universities for four years under the 1980 Military Regime. 
It was already a required course at secondary and high schools all around 
Turkey. So Turkish students learn the contemporary Turkish history (i.e. 
Republican period) again and again from secondary school till the end of either 
high school or his/her university education. In other words for many of the 
students, especially for the secondary and high school students the history 
textbooks they read are likely to be their major source of information concerning 
contemporary Turkish history. It is needless to say that this information would 
have an important affect on their understanding/perception of the Turkish 
politics. In other words the content of these textbooks has a tremendous effect 
100 Turker Alkan, The Political Integration of Europe, (Ankara: ODTO', 1982), 2. 
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on shaping the political preferences of the future voters. This is especially 
important in terms of Islam and Kurdish issues. 
Apart from the usual rhetorical cliches, there has not been much explicit, 
comprehensive and authoritative statement on the ideology behind the national 
education policy implemented during the 1980s when the military was an 
influential factor in politics. This is hardly surprising since the educational 
ideology is directly related to, and dependent upon, nationally dominant 
ideology. As a result one can almost only rely on official texts and statements 
regarding particular aspects of education, and on indirect indications, in an 
attempt to establish the essence of the educational ideology which was in effect 
through measures implemented during 1980-1983. 
The issue is particularly important in the case of Turkey because by well-
established tradition the alternatives to the official national ideology are quite 
limited. Since the establishment of the Republic there is a special course which 
explains and legitimizes the Republican regime's policies. In this context the 
1980 Military Regime also made use of education policies in order to spread its 
own perception of Turkish politics. 
In 1980s many changes happened that affect Turkish history writing. 
After the 1980 military coup d'etat the establishment of Higher Education 
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Council, merge of Turkish History Institution and Turkish Language Institution 
under Atatilrk, Language and History High Council are some ofthem. 101 
In Turkish history writing, one of the mostly debated subjects is that 
whether there is a continuity or broken off between the two periods before and 
after First World War. In the dominant discourse these periods are divided into 
two as "Ottoman Empire" and "Turkish Republic". 102 Kemalism is outstanding in 
the dominant history understanding in the sense that Turkish history writing is 
limited by this ideological framework. In the dominant discourse the emphasis is 
always on a clear rupture with the establishment of Republic by Atattirk. The year 
1923 is important not only in political sense but also in social and economic 
senses. According to this understanding politically a completely new and different 
regime is established, while economically outside interference was stopped and an 
"independent" development was achieved. 103 
Either the ones perceive a continuity or rupture take the year 1923 as the 
basic differentiation point. Kansu argues that this is because of the dominant 
effect of the Kemalist ideology on the works of Turkish history. In other words 
he observes that even the researches who criticize the established interpretations 
of the Turkish history can not escape the patterns ofKemalist ideology. 104 
101 Ozbaran, Tarih, Tarih9i, 101. 
102 Aykut Kansu, 1908 Devrimi, (istanbul: ileti~im Ya)1nlan, 1995). 4. 
103 ibid, 5. 
)()4 ibid 7-8. 
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Etienne Copeaux indicates another characteristics of Turkish history 
writing by arguing that "in Turkey an ethnic group's -Turks- history is taught, 
not the history of daily life or social life. There are contradictions and tensions 
among the history of Turks, history of Turkey, history of Anatolia and the 
history of dominant religion. " 105 
Before analyzing the reflection of the ideology of the 1980 Military 
Regime on the content of "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and 
Atatiirkism" textbooks it will be fruitful to give brief information about the laws, 
rules and regulations implemented by the military regime. 
The officers as part of their general social policy were determined to 
"clear up" the national educational system from people whom they perceive as 
detrimental to the future of Turkey. Teachers got their share from these 
practices. First of all with the decree no 1402 thousands of professors and 
teachers were sacked. In addition to other political organizations of teachers, the 
Teachers Union is also closed down by the decree of the Ankara Martial Law 
Headquarters' 3. Law Court on 25.12. 1981.106 Besides teachers have to follow 
the Ministry's regulations as in all countries where education is a state duty. 
Turkish had become a compulsory course for all university students. 107 
On the other hand Head of the state and Military Regime General Kenan Evren 
stated that his regime would give importance to national values in the national 
105 Copeaux, Tarih, 7. 
I 06 Milliyet, 26.12 .1981. 
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education. 108 "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatilrkism" courses 
were also began to be taught as a compulsory course at the universities. 109 The 
Minister of National Education of the Military Regime, Hasan Saglam stated 
that textbooks was going to be written again and in the new books the 
knowledge about Turkey would take precedence. 110 In another speech the 
Minister stated that at secondary and high schools and the universities every 
student would read at least one book about Atatilrk and tell it in the 
classroom. m On 20th of October 1982 the Minister of National Education 
Hasan Saglam explained the achievements of the Ministry of Education from the 
12 September 1980 until that day at a press conference. He stated that before 12 
September 1980 the Turkish youth was educated in accordance with the untrue 
ideologies and with the aim of educate them in direction of Atatilrk's principles 
eight laws and more than 200 regulations were enacted; 4669 teacher had been 
sacked. With regard to the history textbooks which were being written again, the 
Minister said that the content would be related to Turkey with 80 %. 112 
In a statement from the Ministry of National Education it is stated that 
from that time on in every textbook there will be the Atattirk's speech to youth, 
107 Cumhuriyet, 10.10.1982. 
I 08 Milliyet, 4 .11. 1982. 
109 Cumhuriyet, 29.01.1982. 
110 The course programs for "Turkish History of Renovation" taught at higher education 
institutions and "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatiirkism" taught at secondary 
and high schools is implemented by the decision of Training and Education Council dated 
27.04.1981 and no:76 (Tebligler Dergisi no:2087). For the changes made in the charts of these 
courses see MEB Tebligler Dergisi vol:44, 14.09.1981, no: 2095; 28.09.1981, no: 2096. 
111 Hiirriyet, 28.01.1982. 
112 Cumhuriyet, 21. 10.1982. 
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the Turkish National Anthem, the teachers' anthem and a Turkish map will take 
place. 113 The effects of this decision began to be seen since mid-1980s. At the 
beginnings and ends of many textbooks there is a non-textual group of symbols, 
independent from the content of the book, does not vary much from one book to 
another, forms the framework in which the discourse is settled and totality is in 
accordance with the ideological criteria. This group of symbols is what Copeaux 
called as ''Kemalist mechanism". 114 In total this ''Kemalist mechanism" contains 
seven elements: At the beginning of the book there should be National Anthem, 
Turkish flag, a picture of Atatiirk, and his speech for Turkish youth (Gen~lige 
Hitabe). At the end of the book Teachers Anthem, Turkish map with 
geographical regions, ''World of Turks" map (Central Asian Turkic Republics) 
since 1993. In addition no textbook can be taught at schools without the 
approval of the Teaching and Training Committee, even it is supplementary. us 
Teaching and Training Council (Talim ve Terbiye Kurulu), which decides 
whether school textbooks are in accordance with the programs and state's 
ideology, is the primary continuity factor in Turkish education system since 
1924. 
113 Giin~, 19.09.1982; Besides by the decision of Teaching and Training Council, dated 26 
April 1993 and no: 2381, a "World of Turks" (Central Asian Turkic Republics) map was 
added to this mechanism. This can be interpreted as the addition of the Turco-phone world to 
the elements that official discourse used to constitute an identity. 
114 Copeaux. Tarih, 119 
!IS Cumhuriyet, 2.10.1982 
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In general, since 1924, textbooks that do not have the permission of 
Teaching and Training Council cannot be taught in any school under the control 
of the state. This permission covers the atlases, reading books, general books and 
it is also effective in religious schools (imam Hatip Liseleri) under the control of 
state. This permission also means an important commercial value because of the 
size of the market. Thus it is to the benefit of both the author and the publisher to 
obey the rules. This official constraint is so heavy that titles and sub-titles in these 
textbooks are all the same. This uniformity in school discourse becomes evident in 
the history textbooks, despite the fact that there are many authors. 116 
In Turkey there is still the need to legitimize every policy by Kemalist 
principles. The use of Atatiirkist thought instead of Kemalism designates the 
personality of the founder more than the ideology itself This 
reference/designation has a formal characteristics, because it is not needed any 
more to prove that the policy is in accordance with the ideology, just referring to 
the name of the founder is sufficient. Atatiirk, his personality and principles can 
not be dismissed, but although it seems contradictory, there is another ideology 
being shaped. 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis appears in "Turkish Republic History of 
Renovation and Atatiirkism" textbooks only as a secondary ideology. Because 
this course was fundamentally designed as a regime legitimization course and 
116 Copeaux, Tarih, n9-80. 
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because one of the major characteristics of the Military Regime's ideology has 
been the exaltation of Atatiirk and his period, in these textbooks Atatiirk is seen 
as the dominant national character. He appears to be the national hero who did 
everything that is good for Turkish Nation. Although Kemalism is the dominant 
ideology and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is only secondary and implicit ideology 
in these textbooks the latter appears to be the dominant discourse in all other 
history textbooks. 117 Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was designed against the Marxist 
effect in Turkey. After the dissolution of USSR and the independence of Turco-
phone Republics the Hearth and its sympathizers realized a new activity area and 
they started to increase the cultural effectiveness of Turkey in this region. As 
mentioned above there are various views on the real effect of Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis, that is difficult to measure. But since it is established in the academic 
circles, its role in the production of school discourse is important. 118 In other 
words after 1980 in school textbooks a multi expositions of discourses can be 
observed, namely Kemalism and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. 119 
In the introduction parts of history textbooks of the last decade these 
cultural goals show themselves: culture under the service of state and 
nationalism; seeing even the higher education as a patriotic school; organizing 
the cultural explanation in a chauvinistic and ethnic way; encouraging Turks 
117 For the ana1ysis of the history textbooks used at Turkish secondary and high schools in 
terms of the dominant discourse they contain see ibid 
118Copeaux, Tanh, 71. 
119ibid, 61-62. 
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living in Europe not to break off their ties from their pasts~ lastly, Turkish state's 
care for Turks "living outside Turkey" by strengthening the idea of having the 
same Turkish roots more than being a citizen of a country (at least in cultural 
terms). All of these indicates making Turks' history an expression of straight 
lined approach, an expression of the reluctance to consider the cultural changes 
in history: As if Turkish people stayed the same as they were in the early times 
and they were ready to accept Islam which suits them very well. 
3.3. The Case Study (Ideology in the "Turkish Republic History of 
Renovation and Atatiirkism" textbooks) 
The textbooks are analyzed in terms of ideological criticism by looking at 
the reflections of official history thesis, the governmental interventions, the 
political engagements reflected in the school cuniculum. 120 
Today the names of history textbooks in Turkey are "National History", 
"General Turkish History", ''History", ''History of Islam", "Ottoman History", 
"Science History" and "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and 
Atatiirkism". As can be understood from the names of the courses, "TR History 
of Renovation and Ataturkism" textbooks are detached from other history 
12~eumann, "Tarihin Yaran ", 106. 
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textbooks121 . The absence of an intermediary period result in a mental cut off 
Besides this separation, on the one hand, tries to put Atati.irkism to in a non-
political arena, on the other hand it places Ottoman Empire into a dual situation: 
Taking Ottoman Empire as a Turkish state which is predecessor of Turkish 
Republic and secondly seeing Ottoman Empire in a completely original state and 
ignoring the continuity. 122 
The history of Turkish Republic is inevitably a nation-state history. The 
Republic is established on the basis of ethnic majority that is Turk but also on 
the citizenship notion. The explanation of this period (1923-1995) should cover 
a totality of a society that has certain political boundaries123 and so it should 
reflect all social, economic, cultural and political diversities, problems and 
developments. However the Turkish history books do not mention the diversity 
living in the society and culture although they talk about the rich and colorful 
culture of Anatolia, only the archeological and architectural diversity is referred. 
Neither various ethnic groups, nor different belief systems, nor different value 
judgments and organization forms is mentioned in history books. 
The textbooks of "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and 
Atati.irkism" vary little from publisher to publisher and from year to year. 
Although there are some differences in terms of content all books cover a 
121 MEB Tarih Ive 2 (Ministry of National Education, History 1and2). 
122 Bii~ra Behar Ersanh, iktidar ve Tarih: Tiirkiye 'de "Resmi Tarih" Tezinin Olu~mu, 1929-
1937, (istanbul: Afa Yaymc1hk, 1996), 228. 
123ibid, 227. 
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considerable number of the same persons, places, and events in Turkish history. 
All use a common descriptive vocabulary when they discuss political leaders, 
institutions, and social events. Finally the judgments they make as to what 
constitute social problems and solutions are also remarkably similar. 
In the present form of Republican history understanding every event 
whenever it happened has to be compared to the Kemalist period's success and 
because of this it is in a situation where regret is emphasized more than the 
realities. Just as the periodization of the Ottoman Empire, the period between 
1923 and 1945 is dealt with as a rising period and the following periods are 
treated as if they are standstill and recession periods which have to be hidden. 
Since the times after 194 5 are not explained to the students the comparison is 
impossible. 
In the ''History of Renovation" textbooks the Atatiirk period is evaluated 
completely as if it is over politics. As a result of this, the continuity required by 
the history conscious can not be conveyed to the students. "Turkish Republic 
History of Renovation and Atatiirkism" textbooks are about almost completely 
Atatiirk, Independence War and Atatiirkism. In these textbooks neither the 
history of opposition is seen nor the historical background of the concepts such 
as nation-state, constitution and republic is ever mentioned. The comparison of 
this formation with the synchronous collapse of some other empires is never 
made. It is tried to put all the developments into a frame peculiar to "us" and 
"extraordinary". 
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Another characteristics of Republican history is that it talks about ''threat" on 
every occasion. 124 As anyone can guess this threat cult encourages the hostilities 
to the outside world. Ersanh argues that the notions of 'threat' and 'enemy' 
referred in the textbooks are outdated because these textbooks cover the time 
period between 1908-1940. 125 Even if the aim is to warn the young Turkish 
people against the 'possible enemies' under the rapidly changing conditions of 
the international politics one can not expect that the 'enemies' of 1930s to be the 
same in 1980s. 
3.3.1. Background of "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatiirkism" 
courses 
"Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatiirkism" courses 
emerged as an instrument of the project of adopting and spreading the newly 
established regime's126 ideology to the Turkish society. In order to guarantee that 
the new generations adopt the new regime "History of Revolution" course that 
124 ibid, 230. 
125 ibid, 231. 
126 Here it should be mentioned that one of the main arguments of the Kemalist ideology is 
that it is completely a different Turkish state. Kemalism rejects any continuation and relation 
between its regime and the prC'\ious regime. Thus as a result Kemalists maintains the \iew 
that in 1920s a completely different Turkish state is established. Although it is true that the 
Turkish state has tremendously different characteristics there has been a continuation in terms 
of elites. 
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explains Turkish Revolution and its ideology in comparison with other national 
revolutions and contemporary political movements was began to be taught at the 
last year of all higher education institutions. 127 After the death of Atati.irk the 
phases of Turkish Revolution became the center of gravity and the degree of 
comparisons was decreased. Until the end of the Single Party rule the same book 
was used as the textbook. 128 Besides since the contents of the lectures at 
universities were the same as the ones at secondary schools, the same subjects 
were repeated until the end of the higher education. 
With the transition to the multi-party period authors other than Enver 
Ziya Karal had the chance to write textbooks for these courses. However after 
the beginning of multi-party period most of the textbooks had changed their 
expressions according to the political power's perspective of Turkish Republic 
and the revolution. 129 The effects of the civilian or military regimes on the 
''History of Revolution" lessons and their textbooks were apparent also during 
the periods after 12 March 1971 and 12 September 1980. Although after 12 
March 1971 there was a significant increase in the number of different textbooks 
of ''History of Revolution" lessons, in terms of their contents there was not 
much difference. Except for insignificant differences of perspective a 
127 Toprak, Zafer, "inlalap Tarihi "Dersleri Nasif Okutulmalz, eds. Z. Toprak, H. Berktay, B. 
Tanor (istanbul: Samtal Ya}1nevi, 1997), 16; Erdal Asian, Devrim Tarihi Ders Kilaplan, in 
Tarih Ogretirni ve Ders Kitaplan, ed. Salih 0-Zbaran, (istanbul: Dokuz Eylul Yay. 1998), 306 . 
128 This book was written by Enver Ziya Kara!, Tarih 4: Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti. 
129 For instance during the DP government while Celal Bayar was praised ismet inonu was 
criticized; on the other hand after May 27th 1960 the DP government was criticized strongly 
in these tex1books. Asian, Devrim, 308. 
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chronological event explanation was dominant in all of the textbooks. After the 
1980 coup d'etat in 1983 a new program was put on the agenda and it changed 
the content of the history courses towards a Turkist and Muslim direction 
clearly. The changes made between 1938 and 1983 result from the hesitation 
process on the weight of three different pasts of Turks, according to political 
and cultural relations: Asian Turk ethnic past, East Mediterranean and Near East 
past, lastly the Islamic past. 130 
When the textbooks are analyzed, since 1930s the most significant change 
in the content of the "Turkish History of Revolution" courses is seen after the 12 
September 1980 coup d'etat. Erdal Aslan argues that these courses were re-
organized in a very different understanding after the coup, Atatiirkism was the 
frame drawn with the current worries. 131 The military leaders of the time see one 
of the most important reason of the crisis in Turkey as Kemalism's not being 
known sufficiently. 132 Thus they saw the solution in turning back to Atatiirkism 
and explaining it to the Turkish youth. For this aim these courses are made 
compulsory from the third year of secondary schools till the end of the university 
education. 133 The name of the course was changed into "Turkish Republic History 
13° Copeaux, Tarih, 83. 
131 Asian, Devrim, 309. 
132 Cumhuriyet, 17 Mart 1981. 
133 In this respect it should be mentioned that the 1980 Military Regime decided that "in all of 
the courses Atat\irkism should be ex-plained. Thus with the new regulation in Turkish, 
Sociology, Mathmatics and other courses at secondary and high schools the principles of 
Atatiirk was mentioned in some way." See TC Milli Egitim Bakanh~ Tebli~er Dergisi, 
vol:44, 14September1981, no:2095 and 18 January 1982, no: 2104. 
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of Renovation and Atatiirkism". Some authors such as Erdal Asian see these 
development positive as Atatiirk's Principles were some way incorporated to the 
curriculum, while they also accept that the situation caused an antipathy and 
boredom among young people. 134 
After explaining the historical development of the ''History of Revolution" 
courses which have been seen as a regime course from the beginning, now we can 
tum to the contents of the textbooks which are read at the secondary schools. 
How these textbooks perceive the Turkish history, what kind of citizenship is 
targeted, how Kemalism is treated would be analyzed in this section. 
3.3.2. Content analysis 
This part examines high school "Turkish Republic History of Renovation 
and Atatiirkism" textbooks that appear on board of education lists of "Books 
Approved for Use" at high schools throughout Turkey. The Teaching and 
Training Council selected the book written by Miikerrem Su and Ahmet Mumcu 
as the textbook to be used for this course in high schools in the 1980s. 135 
Although this book was published several times throughout 1980s the content 
remained the same. 
134 Asian, Devrim, 310. 
135 For the third edition the decree no is 7819, dated 9.12.1982. 
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The content areas of the history textbooks to be analyzed are social and 
political developments during the period of rapid change from the war of 
resistance and to Second World War. It covers the period of many social and 
political transformations such as from empire to nation-state, from monarch to 
republic, and the like. These developments involved substantial conflict of interest 
and struggle for social and political power. 136 
In Turkish society the perspectives and debates on the Kemalist 
Revolution, the establishment of Republic are still on the agenda. These 
perspectives on the National Independence War, the foundation of the Republic 
and the Turkish nation state as well as its ideology are all subject to debate among 
the power holders in the society. In this respect, Halil Berktay argues that "right 
now in Turkey Kemalist Revolution, Mustafa Kemal, Republic, are not seen as 
objects of historical inquiry. Thus 'History of Renovation' courses are taught as a 
current, continuing political shield's themes."137 However there have been a clear 
attempt to de-politicize not only the contents of these courses, but the education 
as a whole by the 1980 Military Regime. This argument sounds contradictory at 
first. How can "a very political subject" be de-politicized? De-politicization in the 
sense of prohibiting any kind of alternative explanation to the Kemalist 
understanding; limiting the subject area of history books as dated as possible (for 
136 Asian, Devri m, 310. 
137 Halil Berktay, in "jnJalap Tarihi" Dersleri Naszl Okutulmall, eds. Z. Toprak, H. Berktay, 
B. Tanor (istanbul: Sarmal Ya)1nevi, 1997), 27. 
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instance contemporary Turkish History end in 1940s); imposition on teachers one 
kind of textbook, trying to eliminate everything that would lead to a different 
view, or discussions. 138 
The analysis of the way these textbooks describe the critical issues of 
contemporary Turkish political history demonstrates that the story told is not 
neutral vis-a-vis the perspectives of the various groups involved, namely Kurdish 
people and Islamist. A whole range of curriculum selections favors the military's 
perspective with regard to the social and political events. Although presented as 
unbiased, the historical interpretations provide ideological justification for the 
activities and prerogatives of the military itself, explain the events with the 
dominant ideology and do not mention the points of views and priorities of other 
groups. None of the textbooks indicate that the so-called religious uprisings 
against the republican regime were supported by any other groups in Turkish 
society, or whether there were any opposition other than religious one to the 
Kemalist regime is not mentioned. 
The contents of these books cover the history of wars extensively. 
Approximately 28 % of the total pages is reserved for explanations of wars waged 
during and after First World War. Both the political developments between 1919 
138 ibid, 26. 
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and 1938 and the policies of Atatiirk period (renovations and foreign policy) fills 
23 %. While the life story and principles of Atatiirk takes up 19 %, other texts 
cover 10 % of the whole book. 
Today's "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatiirkism" 
textbooks on most of the subjects keep the 1930s' perspective on. Since the late 
1970s it no more reflects the contemporary history. The book named ''History of 
Turkish Republic (1918-1965)" illustrates the country history until the end of 
1965. However today's books end at 1945. 139 For instance in these textbooks 
despite the democratic movements during the Ottoman times are explained the 
democratic movements of the Republic is not mentioned. These textbooks 
express an aspiration for the political power of 1920s and 1930s. It will be 
proper to call this as the history of "one power". Because this history does not 
cover social structure, economic developments, political parties, opposition 
perception and international relations. The establishments of Terakkiperver 
Cumhuriyet Fzrkas1 in 1924 and Serbest Fzrka in 1930 are evaluated only as 
examples of the abuse of Mustafa Kemal's personal democracy quest. 140 
$eyh Sait Rebellion is seen as a revolt directly organized by the secret 
agents entered into the party structure and it is said that "they are punished as 
they deserve". Again the establishment of the Serbest F1rka is seen as the result 
139 See, Miikerrem K. Su ve Ahmet Mwncu, Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Jnkilap Tari hive 
AtatiirkfiiliJk (Ankara: MEB Y~1nlan, 1983; 1987). 
140 See ibid, 186-189. 
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ofM. Kemal's desire for a transition to democracy. In this understanding due to 
religious infiltration in the party this experience harmed the country. Therefore, 
in those times ''the two experiences show that the democratic environment has 
not come into existence yet". 141 
These textbooks do not approach the country's economic and political 
developments with an objective perspective. By not taking up the period after 
1940 it gives the impression that after the death of AtatOrk Republic had lost its 
meaning. Besides in these textbooks The First and Second World Wars are 
shown as the major international relations subject that designate the destiny of 
Turkish Republic. They do not establish any relation among Turkey's later 
alliances, social structure, political and economic transformations. 
On the other hand under the subtitle ''Uprisings of Minorities" the 
nationalist movements which are against the Turkish resistance movement are 
presented as a threat to the unity of Turkish motherland, the rebels are presented 
as opportunists making it difficult to wage war against occupying forces. 142 
These textbooks combine Kemalist ideology with a discourse based on 
Turkish nation and an Islamic community which aim to construct an 
understanding of society as a social whole with conservative values. Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis has been the name of the new social unification and identity 
policy. 
141 B~ra, iktidar, 229. 
142 Su/Mumcu, Ti1rkiye Cumhuriyeti, (1983), 104. 
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It is emphasized that Turkish nation has sui generis characteristics with a 
mythological language. In these textbooks the word nation, which is the most 
frequently used one, is always mentioned together with certain adjectives/words 
such as state, anny, hero, honor, honesty, war, religion, 143 
Etienne Copeaux contrasts the principles of education set by state in 
1948 and in 1987 and finds many similarities. In Copeaux' opinion this reflects 
the ideological continuity dominant since the birth ofKemalism. He puts forward 
that the discourse about the greatness of the nation and its history and the being 
proud of this, is still the same. Kemalism preserves its place in the form of 
quotations and the respect to the universality of Atatilrk's discourse. However 
there are also differences. The references to history thesis are not there any 
more: Turkish nation established great civilizations, but its geographical 
expansion or its determining effect on other cultures are not mentioned any 
more. Various times country's integrity in terms of motherland and nation is 
mentioned. 
Kemalist ideology appears in three forms in the textbooks, although 
sometimes they appear in different combinations. The non-textual symbols, the 
passages independent from the historical events such as introduction and reading 
passages, and quotations from or references to Atatiirk. The most visible form 
the non-textual symbols of Republic. Copeaux sees the source of the emergence 
143 inal, Egitimde, 22-23, 27. 
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of the above mentioned symbols the 1980 coup d'etat and its strong neo-
Kemalist reaction. This was first seen in the textbooks published by state in 
1985; Atatiirk's picture started to be put on the covers. Henceforth the 
textbooks with or without these symbols were seen together. In the initial 
editions of the "History of Renovation" textbooks these symbols are not 
organized as in the case of "Kemalist mechanism". The national anthem and 
Atatiirk's speech for youth are dispersed throughout the book in the reading 
passages. Teachers anthem and Turkish map does not appear in these books. 
Copeaux interprets the above mentioned ''Kemalist mechanism" 
appearing in the textbooks as follows: National anthem refers to the nation and 
the independence war and thus Kemalist Revolution; they all come together 
under the flag which is the symbol of nation's success. The picture of Atatiirk 
links the basic-event and the establishment of the regime; Atatiirk is both the 
military leader who won the war, the founding father and the "great leader". He 
impersonates the 20th Century Turkey in his personality. Since his "Speech for 
Youth" is written in old Turkish students do not understand it. Maybe because 
of this it has an effect which might not be the case if it was translated into 
modern Turkish. The Turkish used during early 20th century gives it the 
function of a holly book. Turkey's map symbolizes the hoUy motherland for 
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which many people died and so it is holly. 144 
The photographs contained in these books are also interesting in terms of 
their symbolic meanings: 
The photo2raph Frequency 
Atatiirk's photograph 36 
Atatiirk' s father I 
Atatiirk' s mother I 
The house where he was born I 
His friends during the wars 5 
Arutkabir (the mausoleum built in his name after his death) 1 
Dolmabahce Palace (The palace where he died) 1 
Atatiirk' s funeral 1 
Ottoman Sultans 4 
Famous characters such as Cerkes Ethem, Tevfik Pasa. Mehmet Akif 4 
Other 30 
Total number of photographs in the book 86 
More than half of the photographs in the "other" category is somehow 
related to Mustafa Kemal. For instance the factories established during his 
presidency, a hospital, a dam, Atatiirk is not just an analysis subject like other 
heroes. He is also a reason that confirm the historical analysis, he is both the 
subject and the object~ he is the author and the actor~ he is the Turkish history. 
These photographs together with textual emphasis placed on Atatiirk is a 
product of the view which argue that only Atatiirk and his close associates are 
responsible for all modernization efforts in Turkey. In historical analysis 
Atatilrk' s political anticipation and his personal will are stressed. Praising of 
144 Copeaux, Tarih, 97. 
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Atatilrk as a hero leads to the idea that modem Turkey owes its existence 
completely to him. The emphasis on Atatilrk brings these textbooks closer to 
"rupture thesis". It is emphasized that every modem characteristics of Turkey 
emerged after 1923 .145 
However, it is not easy to construe this change in the ideological outer 
frame of the textbooks because it coincides with a time when Kemalism's 
expression became weak in the society and the political power supports religious 
education. On the one hand, there was a limit to Kemalism which is seen as a 
blocking factor and this showed itself in indirect way in the increasing interest in 
the Ottoman history. On the other hand, there were influential Kemalist jumps as 
in the case of the assassination of Ugur Mumcu, columnist of Cumhuriyet 
daily. 146 
Kemalist history understanding was rejected increasingly and clearly. 
Some people regard the symbols in the textbooks as a barrier necessary for the 
rise of anti-secular movements; others regard them as exasperating remainders 
of an old-fashioned and unnecessary ideology. Copeaux calls our attention to the 
similarity between the "Kemalist mechanism" and a practice during the late 
Ottoman period: Especially during the reign of Abdulhamit II all of the 
textbooks had to begin with the phrase "In God's name" and the praises for the 
145 Su/ Mumcu, Turkiye Cumhuriyeti, (1983), 264-266. 
146 Copeaux. Tarih, 98-99. 
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sultan. He asks whether the Kemalist mechanism can not be only a return to an 
old tradition. 147 
The second form that ideology shows itself is the passages independent 
from the historical events such as introduction and reading passages. 
Introduction passages express the official instructions; they are prepared for 
guiding the students in the history interpretation. Together with the Kemalist 
covers, introduction texts form the parts where the ideology appears 
independent from any historical theme. Since 1931 the ideological and identity 
themes which form the axis of the courses in general take place in these short 
and genuine texts. However they may not appear clearly always in the 
introduction parts. We have witnessed the strengthening of the ideological inputs 
during 1980s. These are texts that call for preservation of Kemalist values, for 
being alert against the enemies inside and outside. 148 For example in the 
introduction of the " History of Renovation" textbooks in explaining "why to 
learn that course" authors argue that in order to preserve and exalt the beautiful 
and rich motherland Turkish youth have to know about the enemies of the 
country and the victories won against those enemies. It is also stated that for this 
aim the best guide is the principles of Atatiirk. The existence of the ideology in 
textbooks is strengthened after the 1980 coup d'etat. Turkey in the period 1980-
1990 is between two dangerous events: The past decade's anarchy and terror 
147 ibid, 99. 
148 ibid, 99. 
74 
brought about a discourse which calls for unity and cooperation. This 
necessitates order, discipline, pride, trust both in individual and state. Second 
danger is the Kurdish problem after a decade long struggle. This also helps to 
strengthen brotherhood discourse, besides to cursing the separative forces and 
their foreign supporters. Thus these introduction texts reflect the anxiety against 
these threats. 
Solutions against these threats tum around three mam points: The 
defensive one calls for being alert against the threat; second one talks about the 
Turkish pride, belief in the greatness of the Turkish nation; third one following 
Kemalist thought. The usage of these themes is not limited to the introduction 
parts. These expressions can be found throughout the texts. 
In order to understand the present problems and find vigorous solutions 
for them we have to understand what Ataturk 's starting point was, what 
he did to save the country, how he struggled with the internal and 
external enemies, what was the mystery of his success. We have to 
understand that we must work in the direction of his principles. For this 
reason we have to learn about our contemporary history, what Ataturk 
had done and his principles. 149 
"Greatness, pride, honor" these are among the main themes of Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis. 150 Every Turk should be proud of her/his nation's past. The 
analysis of the history results in a national conscious; it shows the oldness of 
Turkish culture. The pride feeling is clearly seen in introductory part. "Turkish 
149 Su/Mumcu, Tilr/..iye Cumhuriyeti, XI-XII. 
15° Copeaux, Tanh, 101. 
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nation has always had a superior place in the history."151 In short one of the 
ideological bases of post-Kemalist state, is that "all Turks belong to the same 
culture" and the rejection of any type of difference between Turks show 
themselves beginning from the introductory parts. 
Another issue is the ability of Turks to fonn political organizations and 
the geographical expansion of Turks on three continents. State and empire are 
the key words which are used regularly. 152 The chapter titled Turkish Army and 
National Defense is also significant in tenns of the ideological influence of 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in these textbooks. The Turkish Army is seen identical 
with the nation. Characteristics of Turks as being a militaristic nation makes 
them superior to any other nation. 
Among Turkish Nation 's characteristics military as a profession and its 
superior ability in the military art are very famous. Turks created the 
regular, disciplined, strong and professional army notion in the 14" 
Century. Turks military and army traditions are older and deep-seated 
than any other nation. When it is commanded and equipped well it is 
impossible to defeat Turkish Army. 153 
These sentences remind Ergin and Kafesoglu's admiration of the army. 
At least it can be argued that the authors of these sentences are in conformity on 
the idea Turkish army is great and must be respected by everyone. According to 
them Turkish Army not only protects and defends the motherland it is also the 
best and biggest educator of the country. 
151 Su/Mumcu, Tur/dye Cumhuriyeti, XII. 
152 Copeaux, Tarih, 103. 
153 Su/Mumcu, Tur/dye Cumhuriyeti, 235. 
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A tatiirk has seen the guarantee of the renovations in the army: Our army 
which is always progressive and the symbol of national unity, makes 
preparations in order to prevent the dangers coming from outside the 
country and it saves our nation from dreadful crisis. 154 
The officialization of political design based on the idea that "Turkey 
would not be religious but rather pious eternally" can also be seen in the 
contents of textbooks of "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and 
Atatiirkism" lessons, compulsory in both secondary and higher education 
programs. In the textbook chosen by the National Education Ministry's 
Teaching and Training Council for this course it is expressed that "Atatiirk was 
in no way atheistic" and that "there has been no period of history when more 
mosques were built in Anatolia than the Republican period". 155 The content of 
textbooks used for religion lessons was no different from these history 
textbooks. 
Conservative nationalist and religious values were used as norms in 
textbooks. In the textbooks of this period a kind of nationalism close to racism, 
extreme nationalist values and symbols such as warrior heroism, renovation, 
authoritarian state, honor and self-respect, holiness, flag, national anthem, a 
secularism understanding under the service of religion, military-nation are used 
supplementary to the religious values. During this period democratic values were 
seen as the reasons for the social/political disintegration and polarization and 
154 ibid, 235-238. 
155 ibid. 264-266. 
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weakening or breaking up of collective identity. And for a new and strong 
collective identity (for Muslim-Turkish individual) two basic ideologies -
nationalism and religion- were accepted as appropriate. 156 
In the textbooks used after 1980 besides the six basic principles of 
Atati.irkism seven complementary principles were added. The basic principles are 
stated as Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Secularism, Statism, 
Renovationism; while the complementary principles are National Sovereignity, 
National Unity and Cooperation and Country's Integrity, Freedom and 
Independence, Peace at Home Peace in the World, Rationalism and 
Scientificism, Modernism and Westernization, Human and Love of Humanity. 
Authors list the principle conditions for establishing a great state as a nation 
which is Republicanist, statist, and renovationist based on nationalism and 
secularism. 157 
In the explanation of the secularism principle there is a clear attempt to 
prove that Atati.irk was not against religion. Thus it is an attempt to reconcile the 
secularism principle with Islam: 
Maybe Ataturk returned Islam to its brilliant age, by changing the laws 
that does not fit to the present times and secularized the state. But he 
never touched upon the Islamic rules that are based on belief and 
worship. Ataturk was not a godless person definitely. Is it possible to say 
that Ataturk, who had said the following, was a godless person? "God is 
one, great ... The one who make the laws of the material world is God 
156 Kabasakal, Oner "Diindcn Bugiine Universite ve idari Yap1 Degi~iklikleri" Tiirkiye 
Giinlii~ Say1: 6, (Eyliil 1989) 25-32. 
157 Su/Mumcu, Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti, 280. 
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I believe this like I belil!l•e in my religion and the reality itself. " A tatiirk 
had said many such things. 158 
This is the most clear point of convergence of Kemalism and Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis. It is an attempt both to incorporate Islam as a tool against 
leftist ideas and against radical Islam. In this context the arguments of the 
supporters of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis on the subject of religion become useful 
for the Military Regime. 
Turkish State has taken upon itself the duty of giving worship services of 
Muslims. It established institutions that give religious education. Here the 
education of Ataturkist, intellectual, rationalist, secular religious man 
was stressed In Anatolia there were no other period that more than 
Republican period that so many mosques were built. 159 Turkish nation 
and State may continue its existence only with freedom of belief and by 
adopting secularism. It is impossible to turn back. Such an attitude would 
be not keeping up with the present times, being behind the contemporary 
age. "160 
Lastly, it can be said that the reading passages at the end of each chapter 
emphasizes the same nationalist themes. The military successes of Mustafa 
Kemal, the stories about the heroes of the war time period, Atatiirk's speeches 
on the abolishment of sultanate, on the I 0th anniversary of the establishment of 
the Republic and for the youth, and inonii' s speech for the death of Atatiirk are 
some examples for these readings passages. 
158 ibid, 264. 
159 emphasis added. 
160 Su/Mumcu, Turkiye Cumhuriyeti, 263-265. 
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Third and last appearance of ideology is making direct quotations from 
or referring to Atatilrk in the texts. There are innumerable quotations from 
Atatilrk basically in two forms: Quotations in the text and a reading about 
Atatilrk. Open or covert reference to Atatilrk. The open references to Atatilrk 
has three benefits: In terms of history writing, it gives us an opportunity to 
understand how the image of Mustafa Kemal sustained in school life and how his 
name became identical with Turkish history (the perception that Republic is the 
peak of the deep and old Turkish history and Republic is meaningful with the 
name of Mustafa Kemal). Secondly in terms of politics, it shows in which time 
period the neo-Kemalist ideology resulting from the 1980 coup d'etat was 
included in the textbooks and because this time period coincided a time when the 
influence of expression of the mentioned ideology began to decrease. This can 
be interpreted as Ozal's negative attitude towards Atatilrk and Kemalist 
bureaucracy's reaction to this attitude. Thirdly in methodological terms the clear 
expression ofKemalist ideology helps to differentiate the events and periods that 
are especially important easily. 
In this context it can be argued that the content of these textbooks both 
before and after the 1980 Military Regime are based on Atatilrk's "Speech'', 
which is political document, a document that has the characteristic of a politician's 
getting even with his opponents. 161 Thus these textbooks has a characteristic that 
161 Ozan Erozden. in "inla/ap Tari hi" Ders/eri Nasif Okutulmalz, eds. Z. Toprak, H. Berktay, 
B. Tanor (istanbul: Sarmal Yaymevi, 1997), 51. 
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by them the Kemalist Revolution and ideology is tried to be legitimized and its 
rightness is defended. In other words even if there is no clear ideological sign, by 
transmitting the common memory structure to the reader, identity function is 
preserved. Although it is stated that Kemalism increasingly shares its sphere of 
influence with Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and we have to keep in mind that even in 
1930s these two exist together in the school textbooks. 162 
162 Copeaux, Tarih, 114-115. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
In this thesis it is argued that in Turkey, high-school students are 
exposed to a particular interpretation of history. This particular historical 
understanding which came about in the 1980s is ideologically shaped by 
Kemalism and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse. Kemalism, being the 
dominant ideology of the Republican Regime since 1930s is still prevalent in the 
school textbooks as the official ideology. An arrogant Turkish nationalism, 
which has its roots in the historical developments, is preserved in the school 
textbooks. However, one can also note the influence of Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis discourse in the school textbooks. It is especially interesting to see its 
effects in the "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatiirkism" 
textbooks used after the 1980 Military Coup D'etat. Because these courses are 
originally designed to convey the official ideology that is Kemalism to the 
students since 1930s. 
The increase in the influence of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis on the 
history textbooks can be evaluated in various ways. However the most 
important factor in this respect appears to be the ideological stance of the 1980 
Military Regime. The generals saw the leftist political movements as a threat to 
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the existence and unity of Turkish society. In this respect they used Islam as a 
counter-balancing factor against the power of left in the society. The perception 
of the Military Regime and the supporters of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis 
coincided. The Military Regime used and tolerated Islamist arguments of 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse put forward by the Intellectuals' Hearth as 
long as they committed to the secularism principle of Republic and Atatiirkism. 
On the other hand, the supporters of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, just as other 
political discourses occur in Turkey, felt they are obliged to reconcile their views 
with Kemalism somehow. 
As can be understood from the content analysis of "Turkish Republic 
History of Renovation and Atatiirkism" textbooks used between 1980 and 1990, 
there is a convergence between these two "contradictory" ideologies. Kemalism 
is still the dominant ideology and one of its major disseminating tool is "Turkish 
Republic History of Renovation and Ataturkism" courses and textbooks. 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, on the other hand increases the role of Islam in the 
official discourse. Most of the themes of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, such as the 
'1hreat" notion, being proud of nation and history of the nation, the army are 
stressed in these textbooks regularly. 
All the chapters in these textbooks that pertained to the period after the 
establishment of republican regime advocates a symbiotic relationship between a 
good citizen and Kemalist ideology. The early Republican years constituted a 
crucial period in the formation of Turkish nation and establishment of the 
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republican regime. The notions related to those times are still in the political 
agenda. Thus these books by providing description of the activities and the 
intentions of the Kemalist regime, of which the military sees itself as the protector 
legitimizes a political stance. All of the textbooks describe the laws and the period 
itself in terms of reform and progress. The products of the Republican regime are 
presented as holy values that should be protected for the survival of the nation. 
Students are taught to be Turkish nationalist, loyal to a history composed of a 
great nationhood, a brave army and a strong state tradition, following Atatilrk's 
principles and secular. But the type of secularism promoted in the textbooks does 
not exclude Islam. In this understanding individual is seen as identical with people, 
and people is identical with the state. Thus in the last analysis the will of individual 
must be in conformity with the state. Accordingly the good citizen is the one who 
gives importance to the nationalist, religious but secular and statist values. 
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